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On July 22, 1972, Joseph Loder was arrested for attacking San Diego 
Police Officer Gosnell, who was clubbing with Loder’s wife.1  Loder was 
charged with battery, obstructing a police officer, and disturbing the peace.2 
After Officer Gosnell was suspended from duty in connection with the
beating incident, the San Diego City Attorney declined to press charges
against Loder.3  Loder agreed not to pursue any civil action against Officer 
Gosnell in exchange for the dismissal of the criminal complaint.4 
Concerned about the detrimental impact of the arrest record, Loder
requested the San Diego Police Department “erase” his arrest record—but 
the Police Department took no action.5  Loder then sued for the same 
remedy and to notify any agency that had been made aware of the arrest
that the record had been erased.6  The Supreme Court of California, affirming
the lower courts’ decisions, denied Loder the relief requested, and held 
that no California statute compelled the erasure of his arrest record.7  In





 3. 	Id. 
4. 	Id.
 5. 	Id. at 626–27. 
6. 	Id. at 627. 
7. Id.  Procedurally, Joseph Loder elected to seek a writ of mandate with the
Superior Court—an action that compels performance by any lower court. See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1085(a) (West 2015) (“A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to
any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to
compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the 
party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, 
370
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1975, the California legislature enacted Penal Code section 851.8, allowing
courts to seal and destroy criminal records of persons who were factually
innocent and acquitted at trial—the exact remedy Loder sought but was 
ineligible for under the original version of the statute.8 
Today, the state of California provides a comprehensive expungement 
scheme to allow certain individuals to seal and destroy their criminal 
records and obtain a declaration of factual innocence from a court of law.9 
Expungement has been a much-debated topic in the United States, 
especially following the financial crisis that caused unemployment levels 
to spike drastically.10  In addition to excluding many individuals from the 
corporation, board, or person.”).  To be eligible for the writ, a petitioner must meet “two 
basic requirements . . . namely, a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of 
the defendant and a clear, present and beneficial right in plaintiff to performance of that 
duty.” Taylor v. Bd. of Trs., 683 P.2d 710, 715 (Cal. 1984).  The Supreme Court held that 
Loder’s writ must be denied because he failed to show any requisite duty under the first 
prong. Loder, 553 P.2d at 627. 
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (Deering 1975). Loder’s case was decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1976 and was ineligible for that remedy, which at the time was limited 
to “factually innocent” defendants who were acquitted after a trial.  The 1975 version of 
the statute read as follows: 
Whenever a person is acquitted of a charge and it appears to the judge presiding 
at the trial wherein such acquittal occurred that the defendant was factually
innocent of the charge, the judge may order that the records in the case be sealed,
including any record of arrest or detention, upon the written or oral motion of 
any party in the case or the court, and with notice to all parties to the case.  If
such an order is made, the court shall give to the defendant a copy of such order 
and inform the defendant that he may thereafter state that he was not arrested for
such charge and that he was found innocent of such charge by the court. 
Id.
 9. Expungement of Record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The 
removal of a conviction (esp. for a first offense) from a person’s criminal record. — Also
termed expunction of record; erasure of record.”); “An expungement statute is a 
legislative provision for the eradication of a record of conviction or adjudication upon 
fulfillment of prescribed conditions.  It is a process of erasing the legal event of conviction
or adjudication, and thereby restoring to the regenerate offender his status quo ante.”
Nicholas G. Miller, Insurance for Ex-Offender Employees: A Proposal, 28 STAN. L. REV. 
333, 355 (1976). 
10. See, e.g., Joseph C. Dugan, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s 
Expungement Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1321, 1323 (2015) (exploring, among other things, 
economic considerations of the “rap sheet stigma”); What We Don’t Mention About 
Unemployment, THE ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/allstate/what–we–
dont–mention–about–unemployment/267/ [https://perma.cc/BSQ2-R9W8]; Kai Wright, 














    
 











   
 









   
workforce, criminal records present multiple other problems, not only for 
those individuals, but society at large.  Any criminal history blemish “can
haunt a person for the rest of his life,” creating a social stigma that prevents a
person from reintegrating into society.11  Nonetheless, criminal records serve
“valid and important public purposes,”12 such as the “promotion of more
efficient law enforcement and criminal justice” and “protect[ing] the public 
from recidivist offenders.”13 
The Supreme Court in Loder cited an abundance of authorities mandating 
the preservation of arrest records by various public officers.14  Acknowledging
the harshness of the consequences to Loder—such as “inaccurate or incomplete 
arrest records, dissemination of arrest records outside the criminal justice
system, and reliance on such records as a basis for denying the former arrestee
business or professional licensing, employment, or similar opportunities 
for personal advancement”15—the California Supreme Court emphasized
that “the suspect’s right of privacy is not violated by prompt and accurate 
public reporting of the facts and circumstances of his arrest.”16 The Supreme 
Court was convinced that for arrest records “in California[,] the risks have 
been greatly diminished in recent years by significant legislative and executive 
action.”17 
In enacting California Penal Code section 851.8, the California legislature
sought to balance the interests of record preservation against the severity 
of a haunting criminal record.18  Unfortunately, the current version of the 
statute falls short of accomplishing this balance, by imposing an onerous
burden on some individuals seeking a “second chance,” and failing to 
provide the necessary tools to enable those people to prove their factual 
innocence. This Article provides a comprehensive review of section 851.8
and proposes amendments to fairly balance the societal interests in preserving
criminal records with the interests of factually innocent individuals in
11.  People v. White, 144 Cal. Rptr. 128, 130 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1978). 
12. Id.
13. Loder v. Mun. Court, 553 P.2d 624, 628 (Cal. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1109 
(1977).
14. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6200 (West 2015) (imposing punishment by
imprisonment on any “officer having the custody of any record, map, or book, or of any
paper or proceeding of any court, filed or deposited in any public office, or placed in his
or her hands for any purpose” if “the officer willfully does or permits any other person to” 
steal, remove, secrete, destroy, mutilate, deface, alter, or falsify that record); People v.
Pearson, 244 P.2d 35, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (sustaining a deputy sheriff’s conviction for
removing certain papers from office); People v. Tomalty, 111 P. 513, 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1910) (affirming a conviction for falsifying records). 
15. Loder, 553 P.2d at 630. 
16. Id. at 628. 
17. Id. at 631. 
18. See generally 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law: Pretrial Proceedings § 330 (2009
& Supp. 2015) (providing a brief overview of the statute). 
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clearing their names. Part I reviews California law governing criminal 
record retention and dissemination and outlines the contemporary society’s
main policy considerations for preserving arrest records and for their
expungement.  Part II scrutinizes Penal Code section 851.8, offers a synopsis
of the most significant California case law interpreting the statute, and 
outlines the procedure for filing a petition under the statute—including a 
discussion of the statutory standards for establishing factual innocence
and the statutory burden shifting approach.  Part II also examines the 
specifics of the hearing, including a review of the admissible evidence.
Finally, Part III proposes amendments to the statute that would more
successfully balance the interests of society and law enforcement and the
affected individuals. Part IV concludes, highlighting that the current 
flaws of the statute can be remedied through allowing factual innocence 
petitioners rights to some discovery,19 permitting anonymous filings for
those arrested but never charged,20 and correcting the timing restriction 
inconsistency.21 
I. CRIMINAL RECORDS AND THEIR EXPUNGEMENT IN GENERAL
A. California Law Governing Criminal Record Retention 
and Dissemination 
California’s criminal records22 are maintained on state and local levels, 
with record retention and dissemination regulated under state law.23 
Under Penal Code section 11075(a), criminal records are compiled “for 
purposes of identifying criminal offenders and of maintaining as to each
 19. See infra Section III.A. 
20. See infra Section III.B.
 21. See infra Section III.C.
22. “State summary criminal history information” is defined as information compiled 
by the Attorney General pertaining to the identification and criminal history of any person, 
such as name, date of birth, physical description, fingerprints, photographs, date of arrests, 
arresting agencies and booking numbers, charges, dispositions, and similar data about the 
person. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105 (West 2015).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11075–11081 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); see generally
Wallace Wade, Who’s Lying Now?: How the Public Dissemination of Incomplete, Thus 
Half–Truthful, Criminal Record Information Regarding A Statutorily Rehabilitated Petty
Offender Is an Unjust Penalty and Why Laws Regarding Expungement Of and Restrictions 
on Dissemination of Criminal Records Information in California Must Be Reformed, 38 
W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) (providing an overview of the nature and extent of criminal 
recordkeeping, availability and dissemination in California). 
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such offender a summary of arrests, pretrial proceedings, the nature and
disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, incarceration, rehabilitation, 
and release.”24 Generally, the State’s Attorney General is “responsible for
the security of criminal offender record information” and must establish
regulations to promote such record security.25 
Records maintained by the state “shall be disseminated, whether directly 
or through any intermediary, only to such agencies as are, or may subsequently
be, authorized access to such records by statute.”26  California courts require
that all doubts be resolved against disclosure,27 recognizing that criminal
records contain “extremely sensitive and private information.”28 The California
Department of Justice is authorized to release arrest records only in limited
circumstances.29  Under Penal Code section 11105, the Attorney General is
permitted to furnish criminal history information to certain entities: courts
and peace officers, district attorneys and prosecuting city attorneys, probation
and parole officers, public defenders or other attorneys representing the 
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11075(a) (West 2011). 
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11077 (West 2015).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11076 (West 2011). Additionally, the California Public 
Records Act also regulates access to criminal records. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6250–6277 
(West 2008 & Supp. 2015). 
27. Under the California Constitution, Article I, section 1, “[a]ll people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). “The phrase 
‘and privacy’ was added to California Constitution, article I, section 1 by an initiative adopted
by the voters on November 7, 1972 (the Privacy Initiative or Amendment).” Hill v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994). 
The principal focus of the Privacy Initiative is readily discernible. The Ballot
Argument warns of unnecessary information gathering, use, and dissemination
by public and private entities—images of government snooping, computer stored
and generated dossiers and cradle-to-grave profiles on every American dominate
the framers’ appeal to the voters.  The evil addressed is government and business
conduct in collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information . . . and misusing
information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to
embarrass . . . . the Privacy Initiative’s primary purpose is to afford individuals some
measure of protection against this most modern threat to personal privacy.
Id. at 645 (citations and internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).
28. 42A CAL. JUR. 3D Law Enforcement § 35 (2008) (citing Housing Auth. v. Van
de Kamp, 272 Cal. Rptr. 584, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). 
29. See Cent. Valley Chapter of the 7th Step Found. v. Younger, 262 Cal. Rptr. 496 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (imposing restrictions on the dissemination of arrest records); 7 B.E. 
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 587, at 972 (10th ed. 2005) (“Under [Penal 
Code] 11105 and [Labor Code] 432.7, the Department of Justice is required to furnish 
criminal history information (arrest records) to specified public agencies (exempt employers)
but is prohibited from providing this information to others (nonexempt employers).”). 
374
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individual, as well as cities, counties, and their agencies “in fulfilling
employment, certification, or licensing duties.”30 
This authorization for release is limited by Labor Code section 432.7, 
with respect to employers.  As of 2013, both public and private employers 
were prohibited from asking an applicant for, or seeking, information 
“concerning an arrest or detention that did not result in conviction,
or . . . concerning a conviction that has been judicially dismissed or ordered
sealed pursuant to law.”31 If employers came into possession of such criminal 
records, the same statute forbids employers from using them as a factor 
“in determining any condition of employment including hiring, promotion,
termination, or any apprenticeship training program or any other training 
program leading to employment.”32  Some public agencies and healthcare
organizations are exempt from the statute.33 
This effort to limit the effect of arrests and minor convictions began in 
the mid-1970s with the 1975 enactment of California Labor Code section
432.7 and the 1976 enactment of section 432.8.34  These statutes were
meant to 
minimize or eliminate the lingering social stigma flowing from what is now
perceived to be a relatively minor form of criminal activity. The intent is to insure
that once the offender has paid his prescribed debt to society, he not be further
penalized by curtailment of his opportunities for rehabilitation, education, employment, 
licensing, and business or professional advancement.35 
Acknowledging the disparate impact caused by criminal records and 
employers’ reluctance to hire persons with any type of record, section 
432.7 of the Labor Code made it illegal for an employer to ask an applicant 
to disclose any information concerning an arrest that did not result in a 
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2015). Whenever criminal 
records are furnished for employment, licensing, or certification purposes, the Department 
of Justice may charge a fee for furnishing the information. Id. § 11105(e).
31. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a) (West Supp. 2015); see WITKIN, supra note 29, at 
972. 
32. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a) (West 2014). 
33. Cent. Valley Chapter of the 7th Step Found. v. Younger, 262 Cal. Rptr. 496, 
503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West Supp. 2015); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.8 (West
2011 & Supp. 2015).  Section 432.7 is titled “Disclosure of arrest or detention not resulting
in conviction, referral or participation in diversion programs, or conviction judicially
dismissed or sealed; violations; remedies; exception; screening prospective concessionaires”; 
while section 432.8 is titled “Limitations on employers and penalties for certain convictions.” 
35.  Hooper v. Deukmejian, 176 Cal. Rptr. 569, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
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conviction,36 and section 432.8 prohibited employers from asking questions 
about marijuana convictions within certain parameters.37 
The original section 432.7 provided no protection to convicted criminals 
until the 2013 enactment of section 432.9.38  That law extended the
prohibition on inquiries to state and local agencies, and expanded existing
law to include a prohibition on inquiries about “a conviction that has been
judicially dismissed or ordered sealed pursuant to law.”39  This section 
covers only those convicted through “a plea, verdict, or finding of guilt 
regardless of whether sentence is imposed by the court.”40 
The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
provides nonbinding guidance on the use of criminal records by employers. 
Enforcement Guidance from the EEOC generally permits employers to
take into account arrest and conviction records in making hiring decisions.41 
Prior to the expansion of section 432.7, California employers heavily 
relied on this guidance. The EEOC Guidance points out that “an arrest 
‘may in some circumstances trigger an inquiry into whether the conduct 
underlying the arrest justifies an adverse employment action.’”42  California
courts treat this as persuasive authority on employment questions concerning
convictions.43  However, that guidance provides poorly defined exceptions to
the general prohibition against asking applicants about their conviction 
history; these exceptions are heavily dependent on highly fact specific
“business necessity” incidents, measured by case law defined factors.44
 36. But see infra text accompanying note 41, citing EEOC Guidance that sanctions 
employer access to arrest records.
37. See Miller, supra note 9, at 342. 
38. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.9 (West Supp. 2015) (titled “Prohibition against request 
to disclose conviction history prior to determination that applicant meets minimum employment
qualifications; exceptions”).
39.  S.B. 530, 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
40. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2015). 
41. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction 
Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm#sdendnote101anc [https://perma.cc/
9WTQ-RPJ2] [hereinafter Guidance]; see generally Jon D. Bible, Catch-22: The EEOC’s 
Controversial Guidance on the Use of Criminal History Information by Employers, 64 
LAB. L.J. 20 (2013) (listing out potential issues employers face when they fail to run a 
background check and, at the same time, addressing legal discrimination issues employers 
may face when conducting a check). 
42. Bible, supra note 41, at 28 (citing Guidance, at 11); but see Schware v. Bd. of
Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) (An arrest record, on the other
hand, is not persuasive evidence of anything. “The mere fact that a man has been arrested 
has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.”). 
43. Today, its application would be curtailed by CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West 
2015).
44. Alex Jeffrey Whitt, When Convicts Need Not Apply: Proposing Clarifications 
to the EEOC’s 2012 Guidelines, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 401, 402–03 (2013). 
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California’s current legislative and regulatory scheme significantly 
limits access to criminal records, but their retention and dissemination is
essential in some cases.
B. Society’s Interest in Preservation of Criminal Records 
The value of criminal records retention is significant.  The California 
Supreme Court in Loder v. Municipal Court extensively reviewed the
government’s “compelling interest in limited retention and dissemination 
of arrest records,” which includes the “promotion of more efficient law 
enforcement and criminal justice” and “protect[ing] the public from recidivist
offenders.”45 
Arrests and other criminal records are sent to the California Department 
of Justice, whose database retains all “information about the crime, the 
arrestee, the history of the prosecution and disposition, fingerprints, 
photographs and other relevant data.”46  Local police departments
also maintain “police reports, evidence reports, booking records, property
reports, investigative reports, daily summaries of police activity (‘the police
blotter’), reports of scientific examination of evidence, incident reports, 
and field interview cards,” as well as the “suspect’s photograph, fingerprints,
and in some cases DNA sample.”47  Prosecutors and courts may also retain 
possession of some criminal records.48 
The purposes of criminal record retention are manifold.  From the initial 
stage of arrest through the post-conviction sentencing and probation
phases, maintenance of accurate records is important.  At the time of the 
arrest, police officers must identify each arrested individual: the names
are checked against a database to determine whether there may be other 
charges against the arrestee, whether the arrestee may be wanted or is a 
fugitive, and whether he or she may pose a threat to the safety of the police 
officer.49  An accurate arrest record both correctly identifies the suspected 
individual and gives notice to others that he or she may have committed a 
45. Loder v. Mun. Court, 553 P.2d 624, 628 (Cal. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1109 
(1977).
46. Wade, supra note 23, at 8 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105 (West 2015)).
47. Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254 (West 2015) and PENAL § 13300).
48. Id. (citing PENAL § 11105).
49. Loder, 553 P.2d at 628. 
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crime.50  When an arrested individual is booked51 at the police station, the
record will usually be completed with fingerprints, photographs, vital 
statistics,52 and possibly a DNA sample.
Additionally, law enforcement uses information from arrest records for 
solving the crime in question, as well as other crimes.53  For crimes that 
are likely to result in recidivism, such as “the use of addictive drugs, child 
molesting, indecent exposure, gambling, bookmaking, passing bad checks,
confidence frauds, petty theft, receiving stolen goods, and even some forms
of burglary and robbery,”54 several arrests may lead to the discovery of 
additional evidence and may even identify the suspect’s modus operandi.55 
Police may also use past arrests to support probable cause for a new arrest,56 
as long as there is additional “independent evidence of criminal 
involvement.”57 
Besides law enforcement, prosecutors take into account the entire 
criminal record in exercising their discretion on whether to press formal
charges, whether the charge will be a felony or a misdemeanor, and whether
to offer a defendant a plea bargain.58  Under some circumstances, diversion 
programs may be available to individuals charged with possession of 
50. Id. (quoting Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 39 (Cal. 1971)). 
51. “To ‘book’ signifies the recordation of an arrest in official police records, and
the taking by the police of fingerprints and photographs of the person arrested, or any of
these acts following an arrest.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(21) (West 1987). 
52. Loder, 553 P.2d at 628. 
53. Id. (“We have held, for example, that a photograph taken pursuant to even an
illegal arrest may be included among those shown to a witness who is asked to identify the 
perpetrator of a subsequent crime. . . . This is a fortiori permissible in the case of a lawful 
arrest; and the same identification function is served, of course, by the arrestee’s
fingerprints and other recorded physical description.” (citing People v. McInnis, 494 P.2d
690, 692 (Cal. 1971))).  Identifying a suspect may entice witnesses to testify. Briscoe, 483 
P.2d at 39; see also Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 924 (Cal. 1969). 
54. Loder, 553 P.2d at 628–29. 
55. Id. at 629. 
56. Natalie Lyons, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: California Penal Code
Section 851.8 and the Injustice of Imposing a Factual Innocence Standard on Arrested 
Persons, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 485, 486 (2013) (“The police may lawfully use a 
past arrest to support probable cause to re–arrest the person.” (citing Loder, 553 P.2d at
628)).
57. Loder, 553 P.2d at 629 (“‘Although previous arrests of a suspect in connection
with illicit drug transactions will certainly not suffice to constitute probable cause for 
search or arrest, and while, indeed, arrests without convictions may be of little probative 
value, still a suspect’s reputation as being involved in illicit drug traffic based on prior 
arrests may be considered.’ . . . When the investigating officer knows of such a pattern, 
‘that knowledge can be used, in connection with other information, to support a finding of
probable cause for arrest.’” (first quoting People v. Buchanan 103 Cal. Rptr. 66, 79 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1972); then quoting People v. Martin, 511 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Cal. 1973))). 
58. Loder, 553 P.2d at 629. 
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controlled substances, and this availability depends on prior offenses 
involving controlled substances.59 
Once the arrested person is charged, a court may use the criminal
record—including arrest records—to decide whether to release the defendant
pretrial, as well as the amount of bail, if necessary.60  Post-conviction, a
court considers all prior history of individuals as assembled by probation
officers in considering the sentence and eligibility for probation.61  If 
sentenced to time in prison, an individual may be eligible for release on
parole, based in part on past criminal history.62 
In many circumstances, criminal records can appropriately be used outside
of the criminal justice system.  For example, certain types of employment63 
and professional licensing64 may require an extensive background check 
to determine the applicant’s eligibility.  Penal Code section 11077.2 mandates 
the state’s attorney general to “establish a communication network that
allows the transmission of requests from private service providers in
California to the Department of Justice for criminal offender record
 59. Id. (“In Sledge v. Superior Court . . . we recognized that such ‘evidence’ may 
include prior narcotics arrests of the defendant not resulting in a conviction, listed on his
rap sheet.”).
60. Id. at 630 (noting that the application form for pretrial release asks defendants
to list their prior arrests and their dispositions).
61. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 2015)).  The supreme court explained
the use of prior history in probation consideration: 
Any prior arrest record of the defendant is routinely obtained and included in the 
report as part of his criminal history.  In People v. Peterson . . . we reaffirmed
the principle that upon conviction, evidence which would be inadmissible on the 
issue of guilt may be received for the purpose of determining whether and upon 
what conditions to grant probation, provided the proceedings remain fundamentally
fair. For this purpose it has been held that the court may properly consider not 
only current arrests of the defendant giving rise to charges still pending, but also 
prior arrests which did not result in conviction. 
Id. (first citing People v. Escobar, 264 P.2d 571, 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); then citing 
People v. White, 240 P.2d 728, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)).
62. Id. (citing Azeria v. Cal. Adult Auth., 193 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1961)).
63. Sandra J. Mullings, Employment of Ex-Offenders: The Time Has Come for a 
True Antidiscrimination Statute, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 261, 268 (2014) (noting that “under
a federal statute, a state must suspend the driver’s license of an ex-offender convicted of a
drug offense for at least six months or risk losing a portion of its federal highway funds.”). 
64. Some “highly skilled professions, such as law and medicine, and lesser skilled 
or unskilled occupations, such as barbers and bingo operators” may require licensing or 
certification dependent often on lack of criminal record. Id. at 268. 
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information for purposes of employment, licensing, certification, custodial
child placement or adoption.”65 
Employee background checks are crucial for some types of private
employers. A background check may protect the employer from property
losses due to theft and fraud.66  Moreover, a thorough background check 
may serve as an insurance against liability to third parties under the negligent
hiring theory in tort law: a third party injured by an employee may pursue
a claim against the employer.67  When making hiring decisions, employers
must weigh the risk of searching into the pasts of their current and prospective
employees against the risk of a future lawsuit for possible negligent
supervision, retention, or even discrimination.68  Moreover, recent statistics
support the need to run a background check due to proliferation of resume 
fraud.69  The competitive job market contributes to an increase in competition, 
prompting applicants to embellish their qualifications.70  Therefore, public
and private employers, like the criminal justice system, have incentives to 
ensure that criminal records are accurately reported and preserved. 
Furthermore, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
generally protects the right of access to public information, and some drastic
65. Any such dissemination would be subject to limitations in CAL. LAB. CODE §
432.7. See supra Section I.A. 
66. Bible, supra note 41, at 20; Nicole C. Baldwin, Watch Your Back(ground checks)!, 
24 No. 3 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 4 (May 12, 2014) at 1 (finding employers may have concerns
about various negative aspects of hiring people with a criminal record. They may be concerned
about potential lawsuits resulting from negligent hiring, damage to property, and endangerment
of customers and employees).
67. Bible, supra note 41, at 21–23 (discussing elements of the torts and reviewing
a few cases applying its elements).
68. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015) (barring most employers 
from asking about convictions or arrest records).  The inability to consider criminal past 
in hiring decisions leaves employers vulnerable to negligent hiring suits and retention
risks, or, on the other end of the spectrum, causes them to unintentionally exceed the
boundaries of their pre-employment screening, creating a risk of discrimination liability. 
Ryan D. Watstein, Note, Out of Jail and out of Luck: The Effect of Negligent Hiring 
Liability and the Criminal Record Revolution on an Ex-Offender’s Employment Prospects, 
61 FLA. L. REV. 581, 582 (2009).  Discussed in Section I.C infra, background checks 
obtained through third parties that are not in compliance with Federal Credit Reporting 
Act requirements can also subject employers to liability. See Susan Adams, Background
Checks on Job Candidates: Be Very Careful, FORBES (June 21, 2013, 11:56 AM), http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2013/06/21/background–checks–on–job–candidates–
be–very–careful/ [http://perma.cc/CG3V–ZP42] (explaining the potential for Title VII
discrimination suits when an employer turns away a job applicant based on criminal history, or
the opposite, hiring the applicant and then suffering from a negligent hiring lawsuit). 
69. Bible, supra note 41, at 22 (“A 2009 study reported that 46% of resumes showed
discrepancies in employment and educational history; this number was 5% higher than in
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expungement remedies—such as record sealing and destruction—may raise 
concerns.71  Some proponents of disclosure have characterized expungement 
by public officials as contrary to the well-being and safety of the public,
based on a right to know information which bears on their community,
and claim that public officials are not fulfilling their duty to inform the 
public.72 
C. Policy Justifying Expungement 
On the other hand, an individual with a criminal record suffers from its 
detrimental and possibly life-long impact.73  The stigma of having a criminal
record affects not only an individual’s success in society, but also familial
and other interpersonal relationships.74 The inability to reintegrate into
71. Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with 
the First Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the 
Digital Age?, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123, 126 (2010) (addressing the “troubling
tension between criminal expungement statutes and the Constitutional freedoms of speech
and press” and proposing an ethical, rather than a legal, solution); see Ne. Press Ass’n. v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (finding that a news media broadcast of criminal trial 
admissions and confessions is protected by the First Amendment).
72. Calvert & Bruno, supra note 71, at 124 (“The freedom of the press safeguarded 
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution stands in stark contrast, if not 
diametric opposition, to the underlying policies of personal privacy and the reintegration
of convicted persons who have since paid their debt to society. Rather than burying or 
suppressing the truth about the past, the First Amendment’s venerable vitality rests in the 
constant desire to expose the truth and to test competing conceptions of it.  Margaret Love, 
former chair of the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards Committee 
Task Force on Collateral Sanctions, wrote in a 2003 law journal article that the policies 
underlying expungement of records ‘requires a certain willingness to ‘rewrite history’ that 
is hard to square with a legal system founded on the search for truth.’”) (quoting Margaret 
Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the 
Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1726 (2003)). 
73. See Lyons, supra note 56, at 486 (“In California, an arrest remains on a person’s 
criminal record for her lifetime.”); Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need 
for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008–09) (“Millions of
Americans suffer a life-long handicap as a result of a one-time lapse in judgment.  Indeed, 
a single conviction—or even an arrest without conviction—can forever affect an
individual’s voting rights, employment opportunities, and social standing.”); Mullings, 
supra note 63, at 262 n.4 (citing Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America 
“The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights of Ex–Offenders, 30 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527, 527 (2006) (“Virtually every felony conviction carries 
with it a life sentence.”)).
74. See Ben Geiger, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1191 (2006); Dugan, supra note 10, at 1323 (noting that “interactions with
the law-abiding world are problematic for persons convicted of crimes: the risk is high that 
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society due to a past criminal record may contribute to substance abuse 
and recidivism, creating “an obstacle impeding a changed man’s efforts 
at reformation and rehabilitation.”75 
As a society, we allow expungement because it facilitates reintegration 
of individuals into the workforce.  The social stigma associated with criminal 
records transcends the lone individual’s psyche and affects his or her 
employment chances, education opportunities, and even welfare eligibility.76 
Past criminal records may prevent individuals from voting,77 obtaining
housing,78 and being able to adopt children,79 may affect eligibility for
welfare benefits,80 or impede their ability to qualify for federal loans or
grants for post-secondary education,81 and could even foreclose the 
normally will ‘define a criminal only in terms of his stigma’ and avoid associating with
him for fear of being contaminated.” (quoting Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study 
of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2004))). 
75. Mouzon, supra note 73, at 2 n.4 (citing North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 
247 (1971) (recognizing that “[a] number of disabilities may attach to a convicted 
defendant even after he has left prison”)); Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) 
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which 
not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, 
but which also seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.”) . . . ). 
76. These barriers to reintegration into society have been referred to in literature as 
“collateral consequences” of criminal records.  See generally Mullings, supra note 63 
(reviewing collateral consequences faced by ex-offenders and proposing an antidiscrimination
scheme that would ameliorate the negative impact of convictions). 
77. Steven D. Bell, The Long Shadow: Decreasing Barriers to Employment, 
Housing, and Civic Participation for People with Criminal Records Will Improve Public 
Safety and Strengthen the Economy, 42 W. ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (“11 states (six in the 
South) ban[] ex–felons from voting even after they have completed prison and probation 
or parole.” (quoting Editorial, Disenfranchised Felons, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at A16, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/opinion/disenfranchised-felons.html [https://perma.cc/
47GG-GSNA])).
78. Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied
Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 546 (2005) (“But there are several 
million ex-felons in the United States, and under current housing policies, everyone
convicted of a felony is automatically ineligible for a minimum of five years.  In addition, 
there are tens of millions of Americans who have been convicted of misdemeanors, or
merely arrested but never convicted of any offense, and they too can be, and often are, 
excluded from public housing on the basis of their criminal records.”). 
79. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.4 (West 2015) (explaining that a social 
worker must run “a state-level criminal records check” before placing a child in a home. 
The same statute bans placement of children in homes of convicted individuals, unless the 
Director of Social Services grants an exemption under Section 1522 of the Health and
Safety Code). 
 80. Mouzon, supra note 73, at 3 n.8 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a)–(b) (2000) (disqualifying
individuals with drug felony convictions from receiving food stamps or Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF))). 
81. Id. at 3 n.7 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2012), which suspends “student eligibility
for federal loans, grants, or work assistance because of conviction of certain drug offenses
while receiving such aid”).
382
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possibility of joining the military.82  The ABA National Inventory of
Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC), which gathers data on
collateral consequences of convictions in each U.S. jurisdiction, today 
reports that Californians with criminal records may suffer from up to 
1,818 collateral consequences,83 the examples of which include: “(1) 
mandatory prohibitions against operating or working at hospitals, daycare 
centers, and elder care facilities—even if unrelated to the nature of the 
prior offense, (2) ineligibility to become a certified domestic violence 
counselor—but not a certified substance abuse counselor, and (3)
discretionary ineligibility or mandatory revocations of licenses in virtually
every regulated occupation or profession, from barbers to nurses to
attorneys.”84 
In addition to the effect on the individual, criminal records have an 
inevitable economic impact felt by the entire society: criminal records 
keep many capable individuals out of the workforce.85  According to a
recent study, an employment background check of one in four American
adults will reveal the existence of a criminal past.86  It is estimated that
approximately seven million California residents have criminal records.87
 82. Id. at 3–4 n.10 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012) (“No person who has been
convicted of a felony, may be enlisted in any armed force . . . .” with the qualification that 
the Secretary of Defense may make exceptions on a case–by–case basis.)).
83. Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction in California, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/?jurisdiction=10 [https://perma.cc/7EEU-
DZKX] (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
84. Bell, supra note 77, at 9–10. 
85. See, e.g., What We Don’t Mention About Unemployment, supra note 10 (“[A]
Stanford University study sought to put a dollar value to the impact of these limitations.
The study found that a criminal record led to $5,760 in forgone benefits to the community
annually, primarily through lost earnings and tax revenue.”); Wright, supra note 10, at 18 
(bias against hiring ex-offenders “has had massive consequences in an era of record 
poverty. The United States lost between $57 billion and $65 billion in GDP in 2008, 
according to the Center for Economic Policy and Research, as a result of the reduction in
male workers.”).
86. The “Wild West” of Employment Background Checks: A Reform Agenda to 
Limit Conviction and Arrest History Abuses in the Digital Age, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT 
CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, Aug. 2014, at 1, http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/
Wild–West–Employment–Background–Checks–Reform–Agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
X6UC-FSK5] [hereinafter Wild West].
87. Bell, supra note 77, at 2 (citing S.F., CA., POLICE CODE Art. 49, §§ 4901–4920 















   
 
  
      
 
  
      
   
    
     








    
  
 






   
 
 
A job applicant’s criminal record significantly decreases and often forecloses
his or her chances of being hired.88 
With the proliferation of private background check companies, criminal 
records are now easily accessible to many employers.89  They hire private 
search companies, such as Accurate Background, Inc.,90 ADP Screening 
and Selection Services,91 First Advantage,92 HireRight,93 and Sterling,94 in 
addition to various internet background check companies, whose services are
readily accessible.95  Private background check companies are diligent in
 88. See Bell, supra note 77, at 2, 10 (“[T]wo-thirds of employers surveyed in five 
major U.S. cities would not knowingly hire a person with a criminal record, regardless of
the offense.”) (“Studies have shown that job applicants with criminal records are fifty 
percent less likely to receive a job callback.”) (citing Devah Pager, Bruce Western &
Naomi Sugie, Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black 
and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 199
(2009), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/pager/files/annals_sequencingdisadvantage.pdf?m=
1392390789 [https://perma.cc/3XRR-M2HW]); Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding
Expungements and Pardons for Non–Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 168 
(2010) (citing Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Investigating Prisoner Reentry: The Impact
of Conviction Status on the Employment Prospects of Young Men 20 (2009)) (“Various studies
conducted over the past fifteen years consistently show that on average 60% of employers
indicate that they would ‘probably not’ or ‘definitely not’ consider hiring an individual 
with a criminal history.”); What We Don’t Mention About Unemployment, supra note
10 (“According to the National Employment Law Project, one out of every four adult 
Americans has a criminal record, a broad term covering everything from violent crime to 
arrest without a conviction.  But for most employers, the devil isn’t in the details—simply
having a criminal record can often be enough to have your resume dismissed by employers, 
leaving you without options to earn a stable income.”).
89. Bell, supra note 77, at 14 (“In one survey, more than 90 percent of companies 
reported using criminal background checks for their hiring decisions.”); Wild West, supra
note 86, at 1 (noting that “more employers than ever are conducting background checks
on their prospective employees by relying on private background check companies or on
government databases that are often accessible on-line at the click of a mouse.”). 
90. Products: Background Checks, ACCURATE BACKGROUND, https://www.accurate 
background.com/products.php?sec=17 [https://perma.cc/8BYL-E5G4] (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
91. Talent Management, ADP, http://www.adp.com/solutions/services/talent-
management.aspx [https://perma.cc/YZS7-UBK5] (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
92. Employment Background Check Solutions, FIRST ADVANTAGE, http://www.
fadv.com/solutions/solutions/employment–solutions/criminal–records–and–sanctions.aspx
[https://perma.cc/QK3P-MTNZ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
93. Background Checks, HIRERIGHT, http://www.hireright.com/background-checks
[https://perma.cc/LNG8-QUPR]  (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
94. Background Checks by Need: Criminal Record Checks, STERLINGBACKCHECK
http://www.sterlingbackcheck.com/Need/Criminal-Records.aspx [https://perma.cc/EK3E-VDQQ] 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
95. E.g., Bible, supra note 41, at 22 (“One need only do a quick internet search to 
see that there are many ways to access myriad data about applicants; the www.info 
linkscreening.com/InfoLink/Downloads/link [https://perma.cc/6R25-DNEU], for example,
enables one to learn about arrests and convictions, among other things.”); Wild West, supra
note 86, at 2 (“[T]here is a new frontier of Internet background check vendors that often 
charge cut-rate fees for questionable products. One of the largest companies, background
384
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obtaining all publicly accessible information.  For instance, they send runners 
to courthouses to pull all new criminal charges filed against individuals.96 
They immediately update their files with new information. These entities 
are, in theory, subject to federal regulation with regard to the types of
information they are allowed to report, but lack of enforcement permits
them to report all data that they access.97 
Even though California law limits employer inquiries regarding some 
criminal records, private background check companies access and disseminate
all available information. In several other states, local governments officially 
contract with private companies, like Choicepoint, LexisNexis, and Westlaw 
to provide online access to criminal records for a fee.98  California has no
official criminal records database, and only five out of fifty-eight counties 
transmit criminal records data electronically to Choicepoint.99  Runners 
manually retrieve records in the remaining fifty-three counties, with these
records being stored and disseminated to employers without regard to the
statutory limitations.100 
Error is not uncommon in government records,101 and the reports produced
by private background-check companies compound the errors within
checks.com, charges $15 for each report if the employer signs up for at least 25 searches. 
The company proudly claims that ‘[w]ith the database of over 345 million criminal records,’ it
‘has now become the leader in the acquisition of data from across the country and the 
delivery or instant online access to public records.’”).
96. See Wild West, supra note 86, at 2. 
97. See id. at 2, 3 (The National Association of Professional Background Screeners 
administers an accreditation program “to certify compliance with basic standards of accuracy
and fairness, but only a handful of the companies signed the pledge.”  The industry is regulated
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), also applicable to credit reporting agencies.); 
see also Bell, supra note 77, at 14 (“Under federal law, commercial providers of criminal 
histories are subject to the provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (‘FCRA’) and 
‘generally may not report records of arrests that did not result in entry of a judgment of 
conviction, where the arrests occurred more than seven years ago. However, they may report 
convictions indefinitely.’  Nonetheless, a survey of fifty randomly selected on-line providers
of criminal history records found that despite these federal regulations, enforcement of 
FCRA’s protections ‘appears spotty at best.’”).  An employer hiring a third-party background 
check company must also follow the FCRA.  Bible, supra note 41, at 24. 
98. Geiger, supra note 74, at 1199. 
99. Id. at 1199 n.47. 
100. Id.
 101. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL 
HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 16–17 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_
bgchecks_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZN2-DJLJ] (reporting various errors in criminal
history records maintained by the FBI); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2010 2 (2010), 
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criminal records.102  These private companies are by no measure a paragon 
of accuracy, and errors within their reports abound.103 When charges are 
dropped or dismissed, these background check companies often fail to
update their files in the required timely manner, if at all.104  Other errors
may include reporting someone else’s history due to name confusion, 
reporting facts in a misleading way, or misreporting the seriousness of the 
offense.105  This ease of access to often inaccurate records keeps many
individuals unemployed.
Expungement statutes shield individuals from the collateral consequences 
of having a criminal record, working within the larger legal system to
achieve the goals of rehabilitation and reentry into society.  Furthermore,
expungement is aimed at preserving the personal interest and dignity of 
the individual arrested or convicted, while maintaining the government’s 
record keeping interest and safety interests.106 
California, the most populated state, has high unemployment rates and 
cannot afford to keep capable and qualified individuals out of the work
force.107  The financial crisis resulted in even higher unemployment rates, 
and caused many states to review their laws regarding employer access to
criminal records.  Several states forbid employment discrimination on the
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/237253.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MGU-R8R5];
Wright, supra note 10 (“In the EEOC’s 2012 guidance, the commissioners emphasize the 
haphazard nature of many of the databases now determining workers’ fates.  They point
to studies showing state and local databases with incomplete information that stops at the
point of arrest, ignoring whether there was ever a conviction.  In 2006, only half the records
in the FBI’s database were complete.  They’re also rife with clerical errors, like misspelled
names.”).
102. Wild West, supra note 86, at 2.
 103. See Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1065, 1067–68 (2015) (discussing errors in criminal convictions and reassessing
the applicability of Blackstone’s adage—“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that
one innocent suffer”—in today’s criminal justice system).
104. Wright, supra note 10 (“[T]he databases amassed by private companies often 
haven’t been updated, including to correct erroneous information”); Wild West, supra note 
86, at 2.
 105. Wild West, supra note 86, at 2.
106.  Linda S. Buethe, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records: Avoiding the 
Inevitable Social Stigma, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1087, 1091–92 (1979). 
107. Unemployment in California reached its highest in 2010, with an annual rate of 
12.2%, compared to the 2007 annual rate of 5.4%, the 2008 rate of 7.3%, the 2009 rate of
11.2%, the 2011 rate of 11.7%, the 2012 rate of 10.4%, the 2013 rate of 10.3%, and the 
2014 rate of 7.5%. See Unemployment Fluctuates, FIRST TUESDAY J. (June 23, 2015), 
http://journal.firsttuesday.us/reeling-from-california-unemployment/2211/ [https://perma. 
cc/ZE8S-CL84]; Unemployment Rate and Labor Force, STATE OF CALIFORNIA EMP’T DEV.
DEP’T, http://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/data/unemployment-and-labor-force.html#Table 
[https://perma.cc/9DK3-5HG8] (follow “Historical Unemployment Rate and Labor Force 
Data Tables” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
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basis of criminal history,108 while the federal government provides tax 
incentives to those who are willing to hire individuals with criminal records.109 
Additionally, several states and local governments have adopted the “ban-
the-box” initiatives, which remove all questions regarding criminal history 
from the job application and postpone any background check until later in
the hiring process.110 
The California legislature has attempted to balance the interest in 
preserving criminal records and the importance of allowing certain individuals 
a “second chance” because of the burdensome collateral consequences in
employment, housing, and civic engagement placed on offenders.111 
Thus, erasing a criminal record becomes a goal for many individuals, 
not unlike Joseph Loder, who wanted the opportunity to move past his 
108. For instance, under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA) employers 
“may not engage in any act of employment discrimination . . . against any individual on
the basic of arrest record, conviction record . . . .”  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 2010).
The state of Hawaii considers it “an unlawful discriminatory practice” to refuse to hire an 
individual because of “arrest and court record.”  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378–2 (West 2013).
New York forbids denial of employment due to a previous criminal conviction unless 
(1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the previous criminal 
offenses and the specific license or employment sought or held by the individual; 
or (2) the issuance or continuation of the license or the granting or continuation
of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the 
safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public. 
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2007). 
109. The Work Opportunity Tax Credit provides incentives to employers who hire a
qualified ex-felon, or an individual “convicted of a felony under any statute of the United
States or any State,” and who was hired within one year of conviction or release from
prison.  26 U.S.C. § 51 (2014). 
110. See generally ALL OF US OR NONE, About: The Ban the Box Campaign,  http:// 
bantheboxcampaign.org/?p=20#.VZ15YPmqqko [https://perma.cc/K5F6-7WMY] (last
visited Apr. 5, 2016) (“The campaign challenges “the stereotypes of people with conviction 
histories by asking employers to choose their best candidates based on job skills and
qualifications, not past convictions”); John P. Furfaro & Risa M. Salins, “Ban the Box”
Initiatives: Removing Conviction Histories From Employment Applications, SKADDEN’S 
2015 INSIGHTS (Jan. 2015), http://www.skadden.com/insights/ban–box–initiatives–
removing–conviction–histories–employment–applications [https://perma.cc/NU7B-F3BY]
(“To date, six states—Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey and Rhode 
Island, as well as the District of Columbia—have enacted ban the box laws for private
employers.  A number of localities, including Baltimore; Buffalo, New York; Chicago;
Montgomery County, Maryland; Newark, New Jersey; Philadelphia; San Francisco;
Seattle; and Rochester, New York, also have required removal of the conviction history
question on private employers’ job applications.”). 
111. See Bell, supra note 77, at 3–11 (providing a detailed discussion of collateral 
consequences of a criminal conviction). 
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altercation with Officer Gosnell. Expungement statutes seek to remedy
individuals’ wrongly perceived criminality, both to avoid stigma from 
society and maintain self-worth.  Destroying the faulty criminal record
becomes a priority, especially for those persons factually innocent of any 
crime.  Although several other expungement remedies are available under 
California state law,112 none go as far in their effects as the sealing and 
destruction of records under Penal Code section 851.8. 
II. PENAL CODE SECTION 851.8: PROCEDURE AND ITS APPLICATION
The California legislature enacted section 851.8 recognizing that innocent 
individuals should not suffer the harsh consequences a criminal record
 112. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 2015) (explaining that an individual 
who “fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been
discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation” is rewarded with a “release[] 
from all penalties and disabilities.”); see also Wade, supra note 23, at 13 (citing People v. 
Johnson, 285 P.2d 74, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (“Penal Code, sections 1203 et seq., dealing 
with the subject of probation, provide in effect that in granting probation the People of the 
State, speaking through their courts, may say to one who has committed a crime, “If you 
will comply with these requirements you shall be entitled to this reward.” The purpose
and hope are, of course, that through this act of clemency, the probationer may become 
reinstated as a law-abiding member of society.  Removal of the blemish of a criminal
record is the reward held out through the provisions of Penal Code, section 1203.4, as an
additional inducement.”).  While this remedy is “sometimes referred to as ‘expungement’ 
of the conviction,” the remedy under section 1203.4 “does not, strictly speaking, ‘expunge’
the conviction, nor render the conviction ‘a legal nullity.’”  People v. Holman, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 164, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), review denied (July 10, 2013) (citation omitted); 
see also PENAL § 1203.4(a) (“The order shall state, and the probationer shall be informed, 
that the order does not relieve him or her of the obligation to disclose the conviction in 
response to any direct question contained in any questionnaire or application for public 
office, for licensure by any state or local agency, or for contracting with the California
State Lottery Commission.”); People v. Sharman, 95 Cal. Rptr. 134, 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1971) (holding that “defendant’s construction of Penal Code section 1203.4, which would
confer upon an offender the right to have the records in his case sealed, must be rejected”). 
Nonetheless, the “release[] from penalties and disabilities” provides “a palpable benefit, 
such that the conviction may be treated as if it were not a conviction for most purposes.” 
Holman, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 182.  Section 1203.4(a) covers persons convicted of a 
misdemeanor but never placed on probation, who may, one year after the date of the 
judgment, file a court petition to establish that he or she has “lived an honest and upright 
life and has conformed to and obeyed the laws of the land.”  PENAL § 1203.4(a). Similar 
to section 1203.4, these “erased” convictions will have “the same effect in any future 
prosecution of the defendant as if it had not been set aside.”  Wade, supra note 23, at 18. 
Other expungement remedies in California include CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11361.5 (West 2007) (“Destruction of arrest and conviction records; applicable offenses; 
method; records not applicable; costs” requires the destruction of any records pertaining
to a marijuana violation within two years of its creation) and CAL. PENAL CODE § 4851
(West 2011) (Persons previously convicted of a felony may request from a court a 
Declaration of Rehabilitation, which is subsequently forwarded to the governor as an 
application for a pardon.).
388
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carries. The original version of the statute, enacted in 1975, authorized
sealing and destruction of records “only when ‘a person is acquitted of a
charge and it appears to the judge presiding at the trial wherein such 
acquittal occurred that the defendant was factually innocent of the 
charge . . . .’”113 
The statute was repealed and reenacted in 1980114 and today guarantees
a clean slate to several categories of petitioners who can prove their 
factual innocence.115  Subsections (a) and (b) of the statute designate the
procedure for situations where “a person has been arrested and no accusatory 
pleading has been filed.”116 Subsection (c) is the counterpart for scenarios 
“where a person has been arrested, and an accusatory pleading has been
filed, but where no conviction has occurred.”117  Subsection (d) addresses
instances where “a person has been arrested and an accusatory pleading 
has been filed, but where no conviction has occurred”—the same situation
as in subsection (c) but where the prosecuting attorney concurs in
petitioner’s eligibility for relief.118 Subsection (e) focuses on situations
where “any person is acquitted of a charge and it appears to the judge 
presiding at the trial at which the acquittal occurred that the defendant was 
factually innocent.”119  Petitioners who have been convicted at trial but
had their conviction reversed on appeal, though not covered explicitly by
the statute, are eligible for sealing and destruction of their records under 
the Equal Protection Clause.120  Finally, subsection (m) makes the remedies
of this section available to petitioners whose arrests were “deemed to be
or described as a detention under section 849.5 or 851.6.”121 
113. People v. Frank M., 210 Cal. Rptr. 53, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting 1975 
Cal. Stat. p. 2002). 
114. Id. at 54. 
115. See generally 20 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 18, § 330 (reviewing petition
procedure and providing illustrations); 4 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 84,
at 324 (4th ed. 2012) (supplying a general overview of the statute). 
116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a)–(b) (West 2008). 
117. Id.  § 851.8(c). 
118. Id.  § 851.8(d). 
119. Id.  § 851.8(e). 
120. People v. McCann, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“[F]or
persons whose convictions have been reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence, it would
violate equal protection to deny relief under section 851.8 and, therefore, we must construe 
the statute as covering this limited category of convicted defendants.  We agree.”). 
121. PENAL § 849.5 provides that “[i]n any case in which a person is arrested and 
released and no accusatory pleading is filed charging him with an offense, any record of
arrest of the person shall include a record of release. Thereafter, the arrest shall not be
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The following section provides an overview of the statute and cases
interpreting it. 
A. Procedure for Petitioners Arrested but Never Charged with a Crime 
Subsections (a) and (b) of the statute set forth the steps for the filing of 
factual innocence petitions by arrestees never charged with a crime. In 
cases of an arrest with no subsequent charges, an arrestee must initially 
file a petition with the arresting law enforcement agency and the appropriate 
district attorney’s office, requesting destruction of the arrest records.
Subsection (g) mandates that the Department of Justice furnish such forms
to factual innocence petitioners.122  The petitioner must provide their personal
information, including their name, date of birth, driver license number, 
social security number—optional—and address, as well all information
specific to the arrest, such as its date, name of arresting agency, agency
case number, charge or charges, and disposition.  After a petitioner signs 
and dates the request to seal and destroy records, he or she must file the
form with the appropriate law enforcement agency, providing a copy to 
the district attorney’s office.123 
If the police department determines that the arrested petitioner is factually 
innocent, and if the prosecuting attorney concurs, the police department 
must follow the sealing and destruction procedure as prescribed in the 
statute.124  In this case, all records of the arrest will be sealed for three 
years and destroyed upon the expiration of that period. 
Typically, however, this initial petition receives no response but is, in 
practice, a condition precedent to a subsequent court filing—akin to the 
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.125  Lack of response 
“within 60 days after the running of the relevant statute of limitations or
within 60 days after receipt of the petition in cases where the statute of 
deemed an arrest, but a detention only.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.6 (West 1975) discusses 
the issuance of a certificate, which would confirm that the official action was a detention
only.
122. For example, form BCIA 8270, PETITION TO SEAL AND DESTROY ADULT ARREST 
RECORDS, is available for download from the State of California Department of Justice 
Record Management/Record Sealing Unit. RECORD SEALING UNIT, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL 
INFO. & ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BCIA NO. 8270, PETITION TO SEAL AND DESTROY
ADULT ARREST RECORDS (2015). California counties supply similar forms to factual 
innocence petitioners. 
123. “A copy of the petition shall be served upon the prosecuting attorney of the 
county or city having jurisdiction over the offense.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (a) (West 
2011).
124. Id. 
125. Lack of response by the police in most circumstances has nothing to do with 
the merits, but is probably explained by a shortage of resources and manpower to review 
and address these petitions. 
390
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limitations has previously lapsed” is deemed to be the denial of the petition.126 
In the case of a denial by the district attorney and the law enforcement agency, 
a petitioner may request adjudication of his or her factual innocence with
the superior court—the procedure discussed below.127 




Subsections (c) and (d) of the statute allow those who have been arrested 
and charged, but never convicted of the crime, to “petition the court which
dismissed the action for a finding that the defendant is factually innocent 
of the charges for which the arrest was made.”128  Subsection (e) covers
individuals who were tried for the crime and acquitted.129  Previous filing
with law enforcement is not required for these petitioners; instead petitioner 
can request a finding of factual innocence directly from the court. 
In each scenario, a petitioner has the burden to show his or her factual 
innocence, with the exception of those individuals covered by subsection 
(d). That subsection provides a simplified procedure if the prosecuting 
126. PENAL § 851.8(b). 
127. Denial of these petitions is virtually automatic at the level of law enforcement 
entities; and prosecutors often file an opposition.
128. CAL. PENAL CODE 851.8 (c)–(d) (West Supp. 2015); see also CAL PENAL CODE
§ 851.86 (West 2015), which provides that 
whenever a person is convicted of a charge, and the conviction is set aside based
upon a determination that the person was factually innocent of the charge, the 
judge shall order that the records in the case be sealed, including any record of
arrest or detention, upon written or oral motion of any party in the case or the 
court, and with notice to all parties to the case.
20 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 18, § 330. 
129. See Epps, supra note 103, at 1101 & n.178 (noting that “most American
jurisdictions have no legal mechanism that acquitted defendants can use to clear their 
names––that is, to receive some sort of official recognition that they are factually innocent 
rather than merely ‘not guilty,’” and stating that “California is an exception.” (citing CAL.
PENAL CODE 851.8)).  
Scholars have argued that California’s Penal Code section 851.8 is toothless for those
who have been charged but acquitted. See Richard E. Myers II, Requiring A Jury Vote of
Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REV. 137, 175 (2015) (“California has attempted to solve 
this problem by creating a procedure by which a defendant may petition for a finding of
innocence, although in practice the rule is rarely used because it permits a finding of
innocence only when no reasonable prosecutor could have brought the charge.”). Although
this premise recognizes the stringent burden placed on acquitted defendants, it ignores 
instances when acquitted defendants did prevail on their factual innocence petitions.  See, 
e.g., discussion of People v. Laiwala, infra Section II.D.1.e. 
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attorney concurs that a defendant who has been arrested and charged, but 
where no conviction has occurred, is eligible for factual innocence relief. 
In these cases, the court “may . . . grant the relief . . . at the time of the dismissal
of the accusatory pleading.”130 
Clarification concerning the unique stance of 851.8(d) petitioners comes 
from People v. Frank M., in which the court explained that not all subsections
of 851.8 require a finding of factual innocence.131  The defendant, arrested 
and charged with a misdemeanor offense which resulted in an injury to
another person, later successfully moved that the criminal prosecution against
him be dismissed.132 He then requested to seal and destroy his arrest record 
pursuant to section 851.8(d).133  With the concurrence of the district attorney, 
the trial court granted that relief.134  Four months later, the attorney general
moved to vacate the sealing order, which the trial court denied.135 The 
attorney general appealed, asserting that the court exceeded its jurisdiction
because there had been no acquittal and no determination of factual
innocence.136  The court of appeals held that the facts of the present case 
were covered by subsection (d), which requires only that the court and the 
district attorney both agree to the sealing and destruction of arrest records
pertaining to the charges which have not resulted in a conviction and 
which have been dismissed.137  This subsection of the statute does not 
require a finding of factual innocence.138 
Aside from subsection (d), all other petitioners must prove their factual
innocence to be eligible for the sealing and destruction remedy of section 
851.8.
C. Court Filing 
Upon the denial of the petition by law enforcement, or upon the expiration




CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(d) (West 2011). 
 People v. Frank M., 210 Cal. Rptr. 53, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
Id. at 53. 
133. Id.
 134. Id.
 135. Id. at 54. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 55. 
138. Id. at 55–56. 
139. If, after receipt by both the law enforcement agency and the prosecuting
attorney of a petition for relief under subdivision (a), the law enforcement 
agency and prosecuting attorney do not respond to the petition by accepting or
denying the petition within 60 days after the running of the relevant statute of 
limitations or within 60 days after receipt of the petition in cases where the 
statute of limitations has previously lapsed, then the petition shall be deemed to
be denied.  In any case where the petition of an arrestee to the law enforcement 
392
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immediately upon the disposition of the criminal case for those against 
whom an accusatory pleading was filed,140 petitioners may file a petition 
with a court of appropriate jurisdiction.141 
The petition is ordinarily filed as a motion under the caption of the 
original criminal case if the defendant has already been charged.  The
situation is much more problematic for those who were only arrested
because the statute fails to provide any protections of anonymity.  Public 
access of arrest records is usually limited,142 but a filing of the petition
under the petitioner’s full name would immediately destroy this anonymity.
This statutory oversight is addressed by a recommendation later in this
article, which proposes a standard procedure for a simultaneous motion to 
seal both the case caption and the petition itself.143 
Attached to the petition for factual innocence should be the original 
request to seal and destroy records previously submitted to the police, if 
any,144 petitioner’s declaration, and a memorandum of points and 
authorities.145 It is customary to also attach a proposed order sealing and 
destroying the records. Once the defendant files a petition with the clerk 
agency to have an arrest record destroyed is denied, petition may be made to the
superior court that would have had territorial jurisdiction over the matter.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (West 2011).
140. See People v. Punzalan, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 30, 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“Once the 
accusatory pleading is filed, the factually innocent defendant need not even petition the
arresting agency and district attorney with a request to seal the arrest record.  (§ 851.8, 
subd. (c)) Instead, the defendant files his petition directly with the superior court and 
serves a copy on the district attorney, who may present evidence at the hearing on the 
petition.”).
141. “In any case where the petition of an arrestee to the law enforcement agency to 
have an arrest record destroyed is denied, petition may be made to the superior court that
would have had territorial jurisdiction over the matter.”  PENAL § 851.8 (b).  See 5 CAL.
CRIM. PRACTICE: MOTIONS, JURY INSTR. & SENT. § 60:2 (3d ed.) (providing an example of 
a factual innocence motion).
142. 	 In general, details of the description of a person arrested and details of the 
circumstances of the arrest are public records and must be made public by state 
and local law enforcement agencies.  However, such information may not be 
disclosed to the extent it would endanger the safety of a person involved in an
investigation or the successful completion of the investigation or a related 
investigation.
LAURIE LEVENSON, CAL. CRIM. PROC. § 17:9 (2011–2015 ed.). 
143. See infra Section III.B.
 144. See Form BCIA 8270, supra note 122. 
145. 5 CAL. CRIM. PRACTICE: MOTIONS, JURY INSTR. & SENT., supra note 141 §§ 60:4,
60:8 (providing an example of a memorandum of points and authorities accompanying the
motion). 
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of court, the superior court will schedule a factual innocence hearing.  The 
timing of the hearing would depend on the complexity of the factual issues 
and the amount of time needed for preparation. Petitioner must then serve
a copy of the petition on the law enforcement agency and the district
attorney at least ten days prior to the factual innocence hearing.146  In  
many circumstances, the district attorney will oppose the petition, thus
requesting a full evidentiary hearing.147 
D. The Factual Innocence Hearing 
A factual innocence hearing is an evidentiary proceeding in which both 
petitioner and the prosecutor are allowed to present evidence.148 The
statute prescribes the standard for a finding of factual innocence, allocates
the burden of proof, and discusses types of admissible evidence. 
1. Standard for a Finding of Factual Innocence and Burden of Proof
Subsection (b) of the statute sets forth both the standard for the 
determination of a petitioner’s factual innocence and the allocation of the 
burden of proof.  To find that a petitioner is factually innocent, a court 
must conclude that “no reasonable cause exists to believe that the arrestee
committed the offense for which the arrest was made.”149  The initial burden 
of proof is on the petitioner “to show that no reasonable cause exists to
believe that the arrestee committed the offense for which the arrest was 
made.”150  If the petitioner succeeds in meeting their burden, then the
burden will shift to the district attorney “to show that a reasonable cause 
exists to believe that the petitioner committed the offense for which the
arrest was made.”151
 146. Id. § 60:6 (providing an example of notice to be served on the district attorney). 
147. See, e.g., People v. Enders, No. H036458, 2011 WL 6153190, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Dec. 12, 2011); People v. Laiwala, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 639, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
Some prosecutors justify their almost automatic opposition to factual innocence petitions 
by unwillingness to set precedent in concurring with the petition. Because the initial 
burden is on the petitioner, prosecutors are likely willing to attend the hearing and listen
to the petitioner’s case before deciding whether sealing and destruction may be warranted.
148. California provides no court-appointed counsel or free transcripts for indigent 
petitioners.  People v. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 456, 464–65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), disapproved
on other grounds by People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45 (Cal. 2003).  Section 851.1 provides a 
statutory remedy of expungement—a proceeding that takes place after a criminal
proceeding—so there is no right to court-appointed counsel.  Id. 
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a. Definition of “Reasonable Cause” 
Section 851.8 does not define the term “reasonable cause,” but courts 
have consistently used the definition from other criminal law jurisprudence.152 
One of the first cases to define “reasonable cause” as it is used in section
851.8 is People v. Scott M.153 In Scott M., defendant was charged with several
sexual offenses based on the accusations of a thirteen-year old alleged
victim.154  At trial, the defendant’s version of the story was that the sexual 
encounter was consensual.155  Defendant was acquitted after a jury trial
and filed for a finding of factual innocence.156  He argued that a jury
acquittal warrants relief under section 851.8, unless “there were substantial
co[u]ntervailing considerations which point[ ] to a contrary conclusion of
innocence.”157 
Noting that no case had defined the standard of reasonable cause as it is
used in section 851.8, the court adopted the definition used in other criminal 
jurisprudence contexts.158  Reasonable cause was previously defined as
“‘that state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to 
believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that 
the person is guilty of a crime.’”159  The court reviewed the evidence, concluding 
there was “ample rational ground for assuming appellant committed the 
offense” and was thus ineligible for exoneration under factual innocence.160 
152. For example, reasonable cause for an arrest has been generally defined to be
such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and 
conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a
crime. People v. Ingle, 348 P.2d 577, 580 (Cal. 1960).  In the context of a warrantless 
search incident to an arrest, reasonable or “[p]robable cause is a suspicion founded upon 
circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable man in the belief that the charge
is true.” People v. Smith, 296 P.2d 913, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956). 
821 P.2d 610 (Cal. 1991) (“under § 836, reasonable or probable cause to arrest ‘exists
 153. 
154. 
Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 462. 
Id. at 457–60. 
155. Id. at 460–61. 
156. Id. at 461. 
157. Id. at 462. 
158. Id. at 462–63. 
159. Id. (quoting People v. Rhinehart, 507 P.2d 642 (Cal. 1973).  Cf. People v. Price, 
when the facts known to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty of a 
crime’”).
160. Id. at 463. 
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The leading case from the California Supreme Court is People v.
Adair.161  In that case, the Court concluded that Jeanie Adair, the acquitted 
defendant in the case, did not meet her burden of showing that no reasonable 
cause existed to believe that she had committed the crime.162  Adair was
charged with and acquitted of the murder of her husband, Robert, who had 
died of head trauma.163  In her defense at trial, Jeanie proffered several 
inconsistent stories, in all of which an intruder had allegedly attacked
Jeanie and then killed Robert with a baseball bat.164  After the jury acquitted 
the defendant, she filed a section 851.8 factual innocence petition.165 
The supreme court articulated a “high and stringent standard” of proof 
for factual innocence petitioners.166  Noting that the record “must exonerate,
not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt,”167 the court distinguished 
between other standards: “‘[F]actually innocent’ as used in [section 851.8(b)] 
does not mean a lack of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even
by ‘a preponderance of evidence.’”168  Successful 851.8 petitioners must 
“show that the state should never have subjected them to the compulsion 
of the criminal law—because no objective factors justified official
action . . . .”169 
Defining the term “reasonable cause” as it is used in section 851.8, the
supreme court drew on principles deeply rooted in California jurisprudence 
and affirmed the definition used in Scott M.170  This “well-established 
legal standard,” according to the supreme court, is “defined as that state
of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and
conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is 
guilty of a crime.”171  A section 851.8 petitioner “must establish that facts 
exist which would lead no person of ordinary care and prudence to believe
or conscientiously entertain any honest and strong suspicion that the
person arrested—or acquitted—is guilty of the crimes charged.”172 
Applying this stringent standard to the facts of the case, the court concluded 
that the trial court’s finding of factual innocence was incorrect because
“its conclusions amounted to no more than inferences and deductions that
161. 
162. 
 People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45 (Cal. 2003). 
Id. at 46. 
163. Id. at 46–48. 
164. Id. at 47. 
165. Id. at 48. 
166. People v. Enders, No. H036458, 2011 WL 6153190, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 
12, 2011). 
167. Adair, 62 P.3d at 54. 
168. Id. (quoting People v. Glimps, 155 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)). 
169. Id. at 51. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. (quoting People v. Matthews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
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support a finding of reasonable doubt.”173  The supreme court pointed out
that, even though the defendant was acquitted, the reasonable interpretation
of the evidence “strongly suggest[ed] that defendant bludgeoned her husband
to death and concocted a story to cover her crime.”174 
Lower courts have consistently followed Adair’s stringent standard,
imposing a heavy burden on petitioners seeking to exonerate themselves.175 
For instance, in People v. Esmaili, after the dismissal of a charge of
continuous sexual abuse of a child, defendant Bejan Esmaili filed a petition
for a determination of factual innocence.176  The court of appeals affirmed 
the lower court’s denial of the petition, finding that the defendant failed
to meet his burden of proof.177 
When reviewing the evidence at a preliminary hearing in connection 
with the sexual abuse charge, the lower court concluded that the evidence 
“did not provide sufficient cause to bind appellant over for trial,” and
noted that the victim’s credibility was troubling.178  Esmaili contended 
that “because the court had found there was no probable cause to hold him 
to answer at the preliminary hearing, there was no ‘reasonable cause’
within the meaning of section 851.8 to believe he had committed the charged 
offense.”179  The court clarified that the determination of reasonable cause
to arrest is an objective question and applied “an external standard” of 
whether “no person of ordinary care and prudence” would “believe or 
conscientiously entertain any honest and strong suspicion” that the petitioner
was guilty of the crimes charged.180  Consistent with Scott M. and Adair, 
the court reiterated that the petitioner’s burden of proof was aptly
described as “incredibly high” and as requiring “no doubt whatsoever.”181 
Factual innocence required a showing that “the state should never have 
subjected [the defendant] to the compulsion of the criminal law—because 
no objective factors justified official action.”182  The court summarized that
 173. Id. at 54. 
174. Id.
 175. See, e.g., People v. Gerold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); 
People v. Medlin, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
176. 
177. 
 People v. Esmaili, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
Id. at 636. 
178. Id. at 630. 
179. Id.
 180. Id. at 633. 
181. Id. at 632. 
182. Id. (citing People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45, 54 (Cal. 2003)).
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“the record 
guilt.”183  
must exonerate, not merely raise a substantial question as to 
b. Jury Acquittal Does Not Result in an Automatic Finding of
Factual Innocence
The benefits of sealing and destroying criminal records, according to 
California courts, are reserved for “those defendants who have not committed
a crime.”184 The prosecution’s failure to convict does not justify the remedy
of section 851.8.185  For cases involving an acquittal and a subsequent
factual innocence petition, courts distinguish between acquittals in which 
a defendant is exonerated as innocent from those in which a prosecutor
failed to meet the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt—for 
example, when not enough evidence was provided by the prosecutor.186 
Despite the jury’s acquittal in Scott M.,187 the court of appeals held that
the trial court was not in error “to find there was reasonable cause to 
believe that the appellant had committed the act[s].”188 The court explained 
that section 851.8 “is for the benefit of those defendants who have not
committed a crime” and whom “the state should never have subjected . . . to
the compulsion of the criminal law–because no objective factors justified
official action . . . .”189  Defendants who can meet their burden will be
permitted to “purge the official records of any reference to such action.”190 
The court reviewed the legislative intent behind the factual innocence 
statute, concluding that prosecution’s failure to convict reflects its failure 
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.191 This may result in the acquittal
of defendants who are not factually innocent.192  The statute does not
 183. Id. 
184. Adair, 62 P.3d at 51 (quoting People v. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 456, 463 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1985), disapproved on other grounds by Adair, 62 P.3d at 53); People v. 
Matthews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr.
at 463); Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 463. 
185. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 463; People v. Bleich, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 288, 293
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that much more than a failure by the prosecution to convict 
is required in order to justify the sealing and destruction of records based on a determination of
factual innocence (citing Adair, 62 P.3d at 51)).
186. See, e.g., Bleich, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296 (“Because we conclude the 
prosecution’s failure of proof in this case is evidentiary, and because on this record we 
cannot conclude the evidence completely exonerates appellant, we independently conclude the




See supra Section II.D.1.b., discussing the facts of Scott M. 
Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 463. 
Id.
 190. Id. 
191. 
192. 
Id. (quoting People v. Glimps, 155 Cal. Rptr. 230, 234–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
Id. (quoting Glimps, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 234–35).
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create a rebuttable presumption of factual innocence in cases of jury 
acquittal—this determination remains with the trial court.193 Section 851.8’s 
remedy of sealing and destroying records requires more than the prosecution’s 
mere failure to convict.194  Instead, only defendant’s actual innocence justifies
this remedy.195  When the trial court makes its independent determination
to deny a factual innocence petition, it “does not ‘disagree’ with the jury’s 
verdict . . . . It refines that verdict by distinguishing between those cases 
where acquittal is based upon actual innocence and those where acquittal 
is based upon the prosecution’s failure to meet its burden of proof.”196 
c. Dismissal or Acquittal for Technical Reasons Does Not Justify a 
Finding of Factual Innocence 
In addition to jury acquittals resulting from the prosecution’s failure to 
meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, any acquittal or
dismissal for technical reasons other than innocence does not entitle a
petitioner to the remedy of sealing and destroying the entire record.  In 
Tennison v. California Victim Compensation and Government Claims 
Board, after defendant Tennison was found guilty of first degree murder, 
and after having unsuccessfully gone through certain state post-conviction
remedies, Tennison filed a federal habeas petition and prevailed.197 The
federal court concluded that the prosecution’s Brady violations warranted
relief—yet it did not address Tennison’s factual innocence.  Tennison 
subsequently filed his section 851.8 petition and the prosecution filed a 
response, concurring that Tennison was factually innocent.198  The court
of appeals held that habeas corpus relief based on a Brady impropriety 




 196. Id. at 462. 
197. Tennison v. Cal. Victim Comp. & Gov’t Claims Bd., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 92 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
198. Id. at 92–93. Even though prosecution concurred in Tennison’s request for 
sealing and destruction of the record, Tennison could not benefit from subsection d, which
does away with the determination of factual innocence: to fall under subsection d, Tennison 
could not have been convicted.  See supra Section II.B for a discussion of petitions under 
subsection (d).
 399


























   
 
a declaration of factual innocence, despite the concurrence by the district
attorney and the superior court’s assent.199 
In a slightly different context, another California court reached the same
conclusion as Tennison. In People v. Glimps, the court held that section 
851.8 does not empower the court to seal records in matters that have been
dismissed in furtherance of justice or for other technical reasons, because
such dismissals are noncommittal on the issue of innocence, and do not 
meet the requirements in 851.8.200  This matter combined two cases, with 
the State appealing two orders denying the State’s motion to vacate prior 
orders sealing the records of two misdemeanor prosecutions.201  The appellate 
court noted that the legislative history of the statute made it “crystal clear
that, as enacted, the section was not intended to cover a situation in which 
‘the charge was dismissed—for any reason—without a conviction.’”202 
Dismissals “in furtherance of justice” may be “predicated on many grounds 
other than factual innocence,”203 such as to effectuate plea bargains or to 
assist the prosecution in some way.204  Such dismissals are of a technical 
nature and thus ignore the specific requirements of section 851.8: that it 
must appear to the judge presiding at the trial that the defendant was
factually innocent of the charge.205  The court explained that acquittal is 
merely one of the preconditions for sealing records in a criminal case.206 
However, “not all acquittals justify sealing” and “acquittals for technical
reasons usually will not justify sealing.”207  Even an acquittal on the merits
does not suffice under the statute—it is merely an adjudication that proof 
at the prior proceeding was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable
doubt as to guilt.208 
The same holding was recently reached in People v. Esmaili, discussed
above. After the dismissal of a charge of continuous sexual abuse of a 
child, a suspect filed a petition for a determination of factual innocence.209 
The court of appeal affirmed the lower court’s denial of Esmaili’s petition, 
finding that the suspect failed to meet his burden of proof.210  That court 
199. Tennison, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 99. 
200. People v. Glimps, 155 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Loder 
v. Mun. Ct., 553 P.2d 624, 636 n.21 (Cal. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977)). 
 201. Id. at 233–34. 
202.  Id. at 235 (quoting Loder, 553 P.2d at 636 n.21). 
203.  Id. at 236 (citing Loder, 553 P.2d at 636). 
204.  Id. (citing cases to illustrate purposes for which dismissals are used). 
205.  Id. at 234 (quoting CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.8(e) (West 2008)). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. (footnote omitted).
208.  Id. (quoting People v. Griffin, 383 P.2d 432, 437 (Cal. 1963)). 
 209.  People v. Esmaili, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); see supra 
Section II.D.1.a for a discussion of the factual innocence standard in the same case.
 210. Esmaili, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636. 
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clarified that the dismissal of a complaint does not qualify as a determination 
of factual innocence, nor does such a dismissal have any collateral estoppel 
effect requiring a finding factual innocence.211  Collateral estoppel provided
no refuge to the petitioner because the factual innocence issue was never 
actually litigated.212  Additionally, this doctrine is not applicable to dismissed 
criminal proceedings following preliminary hearings or when two proceedings 
have two different burdens of proof.213 The court emphasized that the
prosecution bore the burden of proof at the preliminary hearing, while
appellant had the initial burden in his motion.214 
d. The Existence of a Substantive Defense Does not Always 
Establish Factual Innocence 
California courts have reiterated that factual innocence requires “establishing 
as a prima facie matter not necessarily just that the [defendant] had a
viable substantive defense to the crime charged, but more fundamentally 
that there was no reasonable cause to arrest him in the first place.”215  Proof 
of a defense does not always establish factual innocence: “it depends upon
the nature of the defense whether a defense to the crime charged establishes
factual innocence, for the purposes of Penal Code section 851.8.”216  Some
defenses are “unrelated to the conduct of the arrestee and his innocence,”217 
while others “may be so related to the defendant’s own conduct that the 
existence of the defense negates a requisite element of the offense or 
otherwise eliminates culpability, thereby revealing no reasonable cause to
believe the arrestee committed an offense and establishing factual
innocence.”218
 211. Id. at 634–35 (quoting People v. Bleich, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 288, 294 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009)).
212. Id. at 635. 
213.  Id. (first citing People v. Wallace, 93 P.3d 1037, 1043 (Cal. 2004); and then 
citing In re Sylvia R., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
214. Id. 
215. See, e.g., Bleich, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 293 (quoting People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45, 
51 (Cal. 2003)); People v. Medlin, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
216.  People v. Matthews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
217. Id. (quoting People v. Pogre, 234 Cal. Rptr. 590, 593 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. 1986), disapproved on other grounds by Adair, 62 P.3d 45 (noting that the entrapment 
defense is available “not because the defendant is innocent but because it is a lesser evil
that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part”)).
218. Id. at 350. 
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In People v. Gerold, the court held that the relief provided by section 
851.8 (b)–(c) does not apply to defendants who are found “not guilty by
reason of insanity.”219  Defendant Scot B. Gerold was charged with assault 
with a deadly weapon by force likely to produce great bodily injury and
terrorist threats.220  He pled not guilty by reason of insanity.221  At trial, he
was convicted of the charged offenses and found not guilty by reason of 
insanity upon conclusion of the sanity phase.222 The court of appeal held 
that Gerold was not factually innocent of the charges against him, as required
under the statute.223  The court explained that there was reasonable cause
to arrest defendant and compel him to face criminal charges: “[e]ven from
the current temporal perspective—with all the benefit of hindsight—[the 
court could not] say that an officer, knowing that defendant was legally
insane when committing the underlying offenses, would not have had
reasonable cause with which to arrest him.”224  “Factual innocence,” held 
the court, means not necessarily just that the defendant had “a viable 
substantive defense to the crime charged, but more fundamentally that 
there was no reasonable cause to arrest him in the first place.”225 Defendant 
Gerold thus could not meet his burden.
Likewise, in People v. Matthews, the court held that while proof of a
defense to a crime charged is not categorically ignored, to be relevant 
when determining factual innocence requires that the nature of the defense
show that there was no reasonable cause to arrest the defendant in the first
place.226  Defendant Roland G. Matthews, a corporate president against 
whom environmental crime charges had been dismissed as part of a plea 
bargain with the corporation, moved to seal and destroy his arrest records.227 
The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in granting Matthews’ 
motion to seal and destroy his arrest records because he did not carry his
burden to show he was factually innocent of the strict liability crime of 
illegal storage of hazardous waste.228 Matthews’ defense was that his position
as corporate president made it impossible to oversee daily operations 
within the corporation, taking him “‘outside of the scope of even strict 
liability’ for his company’s hazardous waste violations.”229 The court’s view 
219.  People v. Gerold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 651–52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
220.  Id. at 652. 
221. Id. at 651. 
222. Id.
 223. Id. at 657. 
224. Id.
 225. Id. at 659 (quoting People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45, 51 (Cal. 2003)).
 226.  People v. Matthews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
227.  Id. at 349. 
228. Id.
 229. Id. at 352. 
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was that persons, like a corporate president, are responsible for the company.230 
The court held that defendant Matthews did not present any evidence that 
he had “undertaken all objectively possible means to discover, prevent or 
remedy” the criminal violations discovered.231  Additionally, there was evidence 
that “Matthews did not utilize this power fully and, as a result, failed to 
discover, prevent or remedy these conditions.”232  Sealing and destroying
arrest records was not an available remedy because Matthews “was not 
powerless to prevent or remedy promptly these violations.”233 
In People v. Pogre, the trial court granted the defendant’s petition for a 
finding of factual innocence based on her defense of entrapment to soliciting 
an act of prostitution.234  The appellate court found that the acquittal based on 
the defense of entrapment was the equivalent of an “acquittal for technical 
reasons” and did not entitle the defendant to having the record sealed.235 
The court explained that “[e]ntrapment is a defense, not because the defendant 
is innocent but because it is a lesser evil that some criminals should escape 
than that the government should play an ignoble part.”236  Therefore, the court 
found it inappropriate to determine that defendant had not committed a 
crime, and was therefore factually innocent under section 851.8.237 
e. Ability to Negate an Element of the Offense is One Way to 
Prove Factual Innocence 
One possible way to establish factual innocence is to refute an element 
of the crime for which the petitioner was arrested.238  For example, in 
230. Id. at 353 (“At the hearing on Matthews’ motion to seal and destroy his arrest 
records, it became even more apparent that his corporate responsibility and authority were
not merely nominal.  Matthews was one of the company’s owners and the highest ranking
corporate officer in charge of Diceon at the time of the violations. Matthews had the power 
with other executives to hire and fire employees, to expend corporate funds to institute 
corrective measures, and even ‘personally had the authority to shut the company down.”).
231. Id. at 354. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975)).
 234.  People v. Pogre, 234 Cal. Rptr. 590, 591 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super Ct. 1986), 
disapproved on other grounds by Adair, 62 P.3d 45. 
235. Id. at 593. 
236. Id. (citing People v. Benford, 345 P.2d 928, 934 (Cal. 1959)). 
237. Id. at 595. 
238. People v. Laiwala, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 639, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“[Some]
legal defenses may be so related to the defendant’s own conduct that the existence of the 
defense negates a requisite element of the offense or otherwise eliminates culpability, thereby
revealing no reasonable cause to believe the arrestee committed an offense and establishing 
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People v. Laiwala, a defendant, whose grand theft of a trade secret
conviction was reversed on insufficient evidence grounds, petitioned the 
court for a finding of factual innocence.239  Laiwala was originally convicted 
for taking a master key—program source code—from his employer.240 
The elements of the crime were: “(1) a taking or unauthorized use of 
information that (2) qualifies as a trade secret with (3) the requisite specific 
intent.”241  Both at trial and at his subsequent factual innocence hearing, 
Laiwala showed that the program code he allegedly took did not meet the 
definition of a trade secret: “No reasonable person could have conscientiously
believed that a program that was able to perform only a well-known 
process derived economic value from not being generally known.”242  The
prosecution was unable to rebut this evidence, focusing instead on the fact
that Laiwala could have committed a different crime.243 The court clarified 
that only the charges for which the arrest was made were relevant to 
establishing factual innocence.244 
Another case from the California Court of Appeal, People v McCann, 
granted petitioner McCann’s section 851.8 request, reversing his conviction 
of practicing medicine without a license and finding that his alleged
conduct could not have violated the statute at issue because he had a valid 
license to practice medicine at all relevant times.245  The court reversed 
his conviction for reasons “more than just finding there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction.”246 Rather, the court found that McCann
“could not possibly have committed the offense with which he was
charged.”247  Because “McCann could not possibly have been guilty of
practicing medicine without a license, [the court] conclude[d] the trial 
court erred by denying his motion for a finding of factual innocence.”248 
As stringent as the standard is, factual innocence is not an unachievable 
result for those who are able to prove it.  As will be demonstrated below 
factual innocence, within the meaning of Penal Code section 851.8.” (quoting Matthews, 
9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350)). 
trade secret.  He was not arrested for ‘data theft.’ Accordingly, the absence of any ground
 239. Id. at 640–41. 
240. Id. at 643. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 644. 
243. Id. at 644–45. 
244. Id. at 645 (“In this case, Laiwala was arrested on a charge of grand theft of a
for a reasonable belief that the information taken was a trade secret establishes that he is 
factually innocent of grand theft of a trade secret, the charge for which he was arrested. It 
is irrelevant whether there was reasonable cause to believe that Laiwala had committed data 
theft, a crime with which he was never charged and for which he was never arrested.”).
245.  People v. McCann, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
246. Id. at 874. 
247. Id.
 248. Id. at 875. 
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and with the incorporation of amendments proposed by this article,
section 851.8 is quite liberal in the types of evidence that the court is 
allowed to consider. 
E. Evidence Admissible at the Hearing 
To apply the objective legal standard in determining whether reasonable 
cause exists for believing the petitioner committed the offense, a trial
court must consider all “material, relevant and reliable evidence.”249  Such 
evidence may include “declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any other 
evidence submitted by the parties which is material, relevant and reliable.”250 
Courts may take into account “otherwise inadmissible evidence—such as 
police reports and evidence suppressed pursuant to section 1538.5”251 and 
“all the evidence presented, not just that which would support probable
cause for arrest.”252  Thus, any subsequently disclosed facts may be used 
to establish petitioner’s factual innocence.253 
In People v. Chagoyan, Luis Chagoyan was charged with the sale or 
transportation of cocaine and with possession for sale of cocaine, but after
prosecutors were unable to bring their witnesses to court, the charges were
dismissed.254  Chagoyan moved for a finding of factual innocence, but the
trial court denied his request, holding there was no “need to conduct any
hearing.”255  Chagoyan appealed, arguing that “the trial court abused its
discretion in summarily denying his motion without holding an evidentiary
hearing.”256  The court of appeal agreed and reversed.257  The court held
that section 851.8 places the burden on the arrestee and that because of this 
249. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (West 2011). 
250. Id. 
251.  People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45, 51 (Cal. 2003). 
252. People v. Enders, No. H031941, 2009 WL 2365851, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
3, 2009) (citing Adair, 62 P.3d at 51 n.4). 
253. People v. Gerold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“The present 
tense ‘exists’ necessarily means that the existence of reasonable cause depends on the 
current evidence rather than simply the evidence that existed at the time that the arrest and
prosecution occurred.”); People v. Medlin, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“The court may consider facts disclosed after arrest.”).
254. People v. Chagoyan, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), modified,
(May 1, 2003). 













   
 



























burden, the petitioner must be allowed to adduce his evidence concerning
his factual innocence.258 
Counsel for Chagoyan attached documents supporting Chagoyan’s
claim of innocence to his written request for a hearing, and attempted to 
submit Chagoyan’s own testimony and the testimony of a security guard 
who would attest to Chagoyan’s innocence.259  The court concluded that
the “testimony appellant sought to present would have constituted ‘material, 
relevant and reliable’ evidence . . . on the issue of whether there was
‘reasonable cause to arrest him in the first place’ or whether ‘the state
should never have subjected [him] to the compulsion of the criminal 
law—because no objective factors justified official action.’”260  The court 
then reasoned that because the appellant was not able to adduce his 
evidence, he was not able to properly satisfy his required burden of proof.261 
The trial court erred in refusing to consider the proffered evidence, and 
the matter had to be remanded to permit the appellant the opportunity to 
adduce his evidence before the trial court made its determination on the 
motion for a finding of factual innocence.262 The holding of this case has
been broadly interpreted as guaranteeing a petitioner the right to present
evidence.263 
In People v. Medlin, the court held that section 851.8 allows suppressed
evidence, facts disclosed after an arrest, and evidence not presented at trial
to be considered when reviewing a petition for a finding of factual innocence 
and destruction of arrest record through an objective standard.264 Two 
defendants, a licensed vocational nurse and a director of nursing at a long-
term care facility, were charged with dependent adult abuse likely to 
produce great bodily harm or death.265  The jury acquitted both defendants, 
258. Id. at 424. 
259. Id. at 425. 
260. Id.
 261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, No. A108509, 2005 WL 2234794, at *2 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 14, 2005) (“To satisfy this burden of proof, the defendant is entitled to present
evidence, including live testimony by percipient witnesses.” (citing Chagoyan, 132 Cal. 
Rptr. at 423–24)).  But see People v. Mazurak, No. B171063, 2004 WL 1859674, at *1 
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2004) (“A fair reading of Chagoyan reveals that while, if a
defendant has ‘material, relevant and reliable’ live testimony to present, the trial court 
must hear it, nothing requires a trial court to elicit something that is not offered.”).
264. People v. Medlin, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“The hearing 
is not limited to the evidence presented at trial.  The court may consider any evidence
relied upon to arrest and charge, including declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any
other evidence submitted by the parties which is material, relevant and reliable.  Even 
suppressed evidence is considered.  The court may consider facts disclosed after arrest.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
265. Id. at 810. 
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and the trial court found defendants factually innocent, and ordered the 
records of their arrests destroyed.266 Articulating a broad standard for
admissibility of evidence, the court of appeal reversed the trial court’s factual 
innocence finding. The court reasoned that there was reasonable cause to
believe that defendants acted with criminal negligence toward the patient.267 
The defendants’ contention that they were innocent because of a mistake
made by an expert concerning a tube size had no merit according to the court,
which held that such a mistake did not negate all legal cause to suspect
criminal negligence.268 
Though the standard for evidence admissibility is broad, it is not without 
limits.  In a case in which the defendant was acquitted after a jury trial,
during his factual innocence hearing, he sought to proffer two jury declarations, 
which stated the jurors believed defendant was innocent.269  The trial court
refused to consider these declarations.270  The court of appeals first addressed 
the permissive language of the statute: “judicial determination of factual
innocence made pursuant to this section may be heard and determined
upon declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any other evidence submitted 
by the parties which is material, relevant and reliable.”271 Because the jurors
“did nothing more than listen to the evidence produced at trial, and knew
nothing about the events in question except what they learned at trial,” 
they were not “experts” at deciding guilt or innocence.272  As such, the
trial court had discretion whether to take into account these juror declarations 
and whether to accord them any weight.273 
Cases discussing admissibility of evidence during factual innocence 
hearings all stem from situations when defendants have already been charged 
and had access to criminal discovery or Brady materials.  A significant
oversight in the statute is the failure to allow some limited discovery to
assist those arrested but never charged with a crime.  These petitioners,
although bound by the same stringent burden of proof, have no access to
any exonerating information.  A proposed amendment that addresses this 
flaw will be discussed in Part III.A below. 
266. Id. at 816. 
267. Id. at 819. 
268. Id.
269. People v. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), disapproved
on other grounds by People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45 (Cal. 2003). 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 464 (emphasis in original).
272.  Id. 
273. Id. 
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F. Timing Issues 
Subsection (l) imposes a two-year time limit274 for filing of the petition 
“from the date of the arrest or filing of the accusatory pleading, whichever
is later.”275  This time restriction can be waived if the petitioner can show
“good cause” and “absence of prejudice.”276 
In People v. Bermudez, the court held that the two-year statutory limitations 
period applies to defendants who were charged but never convicted, 
notwithstanding the provision stating that such defendants may file the 
petition “at any time after dismissal of the action.”277  In 1988, petitioner
David Ronald Bermudez sought a determination of factual innocence in 
connection with a 1972 rape charge.278  After Bermudez was sentenced to 
prison in 1982 for an unrelated crime, he learned that the dismissed rape 
charge “had resulted in several adverse consequences, including restrictions
on the work he could do in prison, threats from other persons in the prison 
system, and possible adverse effects on his ability to qualify for professional
licensing in California.”279 Bermudez’s trial counsel obtained a letter in 
1984, indicating the rape charge was dismissed due to innocence.280  In
his 1988 petition, Bermudez sought a declaration of factual innocence.281 
The district attorney responded to his petition, requesting its denial for 
failure to show “good cause” for a waiver of the two-year time limit.282 
The trial court denied the petition as untimely, and the court of appeals 
affirmed, rejecting Bermudez’s contention that the two-year statutory 
274. In People v. White, 144 Cal. Rptr. 128, 132 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1978), 
the court held that section 851.8 was “fully retroactive,” authorizing anyone who was or
had been acquitted to apply for relief.  The respondent sought to seal his arrest records 
after being found not guilty of two misdemeanor offenses. Id. at 129. He complained that 
“the continued existence of the records of arrest and prosecution posed serious professional
impediments and were of grave concern to him and his family.”  Id.  The court held that
the respondent’s record, which had occurred before the enactment of section 851.8, could 
be expunged. According to the court’s statutory interpretation, legislative intent was to 
apply the rule to all offenses. Id. at 131.  This rule is no longer the case, as there has been
an incorporation of a two-year statute of limitations.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(l) (West
2008 & Supp. 2015). 
275. PENAL § 851.8(l).  There is a special exception for filings that were made prior
to January 1, 1983 that is of no import to this discussion. Id.
 276. See People v. Gerold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); People v.
Bermudez, 264 Cal. Rptr. 60, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), reh’g denied and opinion modified
(Dec. 23, 1989).
277. Bermudez, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 62. 
278.  Id. at 61–62. 
279. Id. at 61. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 62. 
282. Id. 
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limitations period imposed by section 851.8(l), did not apply to petitioners 
like himself who had been charged but not convicted.283 
The court then addressed the issue of waiver, taking into account 
Bermudez’s contention that the delay was caused when “he had ‘tried to 
resolve this informally since ‘81,’ and that he had ‘written to the District 
Attorney’s office . . . .’”284  Bermudez also asked the court to “‘make allowances
for [his] layman status,’ and argued that he was unaware of any adverse 
consequences of the dismissed charge until 1982.”285  While giving weight
to Bermudez’s “ignorance and lack of representation” between 1972 and
1984, the court concluded “there was no showing whatsoever of any
good cause” for waiver for the four-year period from 1984 until the filing 
of the petition in 1988.286  Thus, the petition was untimely.287 
In a later decision under the same caption, People v. Bermudez, the
court of appeal again affirmed the trial court’s denial of another untimely
factual innocence petition.288  Appellant Luis E. Bermudez was arrested
in October of 2001 and charged in December of the same year.289 The
charges were dismissed in January 2002.290  Approximately three years 
after the dismissal, in November of 2004, appellant requested relief from 
the police department and the district attorney.291  In February of 2007,
appellant filed a court petition seeking to seal and destroy records of his 
2001 arrest.292  In a declaration attached to the petition, appellant stated, 
“‘I did not know the procedures to seal and clean a record and did not
know this was affecting my job search. This is one of the reason [sic] I
did not summit [sic] this petition before.’”293  The court of appeal affirmed 
the trial court, explaining: “The two-year limitation period in section 
851.8(l) guards against the presentation of stale claims of factual innocence
and encourages a swift conclusion to section 851.8 petitions.  However, if 
good cause for the delay exists, and the prosecution is not prejudiced by
 283. Id.
 284. Id. at 62. 
285. Id. at 62–63. 
286. Id. at 63. 
287. Id.
288. 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 510, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), modified on denial of reh’g
(Apr. 20, 2009).
289. Id. at 511. 
290. Id.


































    
 
it, the late filing is permitted.”294 The court did not address whether appellant 
established good cause and absence of prejudice, but indicated in a footnote 
that “[o]ne obvious example of good cause for exceeding the statutory
deadline arises when the accusatory pleading is filed more than two years 
before the case is resolved in favor of the accused.”295 
Therefore, if a factual innocence petition is filed after the two-year time 
limit, courts require petitioners to meet the requirements of waiver. Under 
the “good cause” prong, courts consider petitioner’s good faith effort to 
obtain determination of factual innocence as well as lack of sophistication 
and lack of representation.296  As for absence of prejudice, courts warn against 
staleness of the claim: thus, it appears that showing that all the evidence
is intact and available, and that witnesses are present and willing to testify,
may suffice as lack of prejudice. 
An outstanding issue never squarely addressed by any court is the
irreconcilable conflict between part (l) and part (b) of the statute.297  While
part (l) mandates that a petition be filed within two years of the arrest of 
dismissal of the charges, part (b) requires petitioners to wait until the
expiration of the statute of limitations for the underlying crimes.  Because 
felony crimes carry a three-year statute of limitations, petitioners are at
risk of missing the two-year time bar in subpart (l). Part III.C of this Article
proposes an amendment to fix the discrepancy. 
G. Standard of Review on Appeal
After the passage of the statute, there was a debate as to the appropriate
standard of review on appeal from a trial court’s finding of factual innocence. 
One view was that a de novo standard should apply,298 whereas others
contended that the reviewing court must accord deference under the 
substantial evidence test and not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court where facts reasonably support the trial court’s ruling.299
 294. Id. at 514. 
295. Id. at n.6.
 296. See also People v. Gerold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“Assuming arguendo that defendant’s confinement to mental institutions between July
1998 and November 2002 would be deemed a per se showing of good cause for the delay
in filing the petition during that period.”). 
297. See infra Section III.C.
298. People v. Matthews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing all 
evidence de novo). 
299. See People v. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 456, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), 
disapproved on other grounds by People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45 (Cal. 2003) (“Moreover, in
reviewing a lower court’s determination of reasonable cause, we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the trial court.  Hence, the trial court ruling will not be set aside if
410
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The appellate court in Scott M., having adopted the general criminal 
jurisprudence definition of “reasonable cause,” set out a deferential standard 
of review, stating that it would not substitute its judgment for the trial
court’s judgment.300  If there exists “some ‘rational ground for assuming 
the possibility that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
is guilty of it,’” the trial court’s ruling would not be set aside.301 
In People v. Adair, the Supreme Court of California overruled this part 
of People v. Scott M., distinguishing the appropriate standard of review 
on appeal from a finding of factual innocence.302  Noting that the factual 
findings of the trial court deserve deference when supported by substantial 
evidence, the California Supreme Court clarified that an appellate court 
“must independently examine the record to determine whether the defendant
has established ‘that no reasonable cause exists to believe’ he or she 
committed the offense charged.”303 
Noting that the statute does not specify the standard of appellate review, 
the court pointed out that the “necessary analytical context” provided by 
the statute would guide the court’s inquiry.304  Relief under section 851.8
is not appropriate “unless the court finds that no reasonable cause exists
to believe” the defendant committed the offense charged.305  Thus, any 
reasonable cause would preclude the court from granting the petition.306 
Under the factual innocence test established by the legislature, the burden 
is on the defendant to establish ‘that facts exist which would lead no 
person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or conscientiously entertain
any honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested—or acquitted— 
is guilty of the crimes charged.’”307  The Court interpreted this test to be an
“objective standard,” which requires an appellate court to “apply an 
independent standard of review and consider the record de novo in deciding
whether it supports the trial court’s ruling.”308  Applying the substantial
evidence test would force the court of appeal to focus only on those facts
there exists some ‘rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant is guilty of it.’”) (citation omitted).
300. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 463. 
301. Id. 
302. Adair, 62 P.3d at 53–54. 
303. Id. at 46. 
304. Id. at 50. 
305. Id. at 51. 
306. Id. at 50. 
307. Id. at 52. 
308. Id. at 51. 
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that support the possibility of innocence while ignoring facts that support 
reasonable cause.309  Though fact finding functions such as assessing witness 
credibility, resolving conflicting testimony, weighing the evidence, and
drawing factual inferences are ordinarily reserved for the trial court, the 
statutory determination whether “no reasonable cause exists” is an objective
question measured by an external standard—would “no person of ordinary
care and prudence . . . believe or conscientiously entertain any honest and 
strong suspicion that the person arrested—or acquitted—is guilty of the 
crimes charged”?310 
The appellate court in Laiwala extrapolated on the exact meaning of 
Adair’s holding.311  After Defendant Laiwala’s conviction of grand theft
of a trade secret was overturned on appeal on grounds of insufficient
evidence, Laiwala sought a determination of his factual innocence with
the trial court.312  Having held a full evidentiary hearing, the court denied
Laiwala’s petition, even though it adopted the appellate court’s reversal 
of Laiwala’s conviction.313  The appellate court reversed the trial court,
concluding that “Laiwala established, and the district attorney failed to
refute, that there is no reasonable cause to support a finding that the 
information at issue was a trade secret.”314 
The court explained that reasonable cause under the meaning of section 
851.8 is “a well-established legal standard, defined as that state of facts as
would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and
conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is 
guilty of a crime.”315  Because this is an objective evaluation, each court 
“must apply an independent standard of review and consider the record de
novo in deciding whether it supports the trial court’s ruling.”316 This
independent review may be accomplished in one of two ways. First, the 
court may review the record de novo to assess whether the petitioner failed
to meet his or her statutory burden that “‘no reasonable cause exists to
believe’ the defendant committed the charged offense.”317  As an alternative,
the court may “assess whether the trial court’s conclusion to that effect is
supported by substantial evidence.”318  Either approach satisfies the standard 
under the statute because the reviewing court “should defer to the trial 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 52. 
311.  People v. Laiwala, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 639, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
312.  See supra Section II.D.1.e for a discussion of Laiwala facts. 
313.  Laiwala, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 641. 
314.  Id. 
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court’s factual findings to the extent they are supported by substantial
evidence, but it must independently examine the record to determine 
whether the defendant has established that no reasonable cause exists to
believe he or she committed the offense charged.”319 
H. Effect of Exoneration 
The effect of exoneration under section 851.8 is the destruction of both 
the arrest records and the factual innocence petition relief sought. A court 
that finds the petitioner factually innocent of the charges must order the 
sealing and subsequent destruction of arrest records.320  The court will 
order the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the offense, the 
California Department of Justice, as well as the arresting the law enforcement
agency “to seal their records of the arrest and the court order to seal and 
destroy the records, for three years from the date of the arrest and thereafter 
to destroy their records of the arrest and the court order to seal and destroy 
those records.”321  The court will also order the law enforcement agency
and the Department of Justice “to request the destruction of any records 
of the arrest which they have given to any local, state, or federal agency, 
person or entity.”322  To comply with the court order, every state, local 
agency, person, or entity in California receiving such a request “shall
destroy its records of the arrest and the request to destroy the records.”323 
A petitioner will receive a copy of the “court order concerning the 
destruction of the arrest records.”324 
Courts broadly interpret the effects of sealing and destruction.  For
instance, one court of appeal held that fingerprint impressions obtained at 
the time of an arrest constitute “records of the arrest” within the meaning
of section 851.8(b).325 Defendant Christiansen was convicted of four
violations of the statute, which bans public officials’ financial interest in 
319. People v. Gerold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting People
v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45, 46 (Cal. 2003)) (citations, internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).
320. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (West 2011); People v. Laiwala, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 639,
641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
321. PENAL § 851.8(b).
322.  Id. 
323. Id.
 324. Id. 
325.  People v. Christiansen, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
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contracts made in their official capacity.326  After appealing and being
cleared of all convictions and sentences on appeal, the defendant moved
for a finding of factual innocence under section 851.8(c).327  While the
motion was granted in full, and all her records, including the DNA sample, 
were ordered sealed and destroyed, the defendant’s fingerprint impressions
obtained at the time of arrest were ordered retained.328  The court of
appeals held that the case was of the type that fit the legislature judgment
in avoiding the burdens placed on acquitted defendants by having an arrest
record, and as such, all records of the arrest, including the fingerprints,
must be destroyed.329 
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Even though petitioners face a “high and stringent standard” in meeting 
the burden of proof, section 851.8 has sweeping effects. Unlike other
expungement measures, Section 851.8’s far-reaching remedy guarantees 
to petitioners status quo ante: it is as if the arrest, charges, or conviction 
had never happened. Nonetheless, several legislative oversights force
factual innocence petitioners and representing attorneys to traverse technical 
obstacles while preparing for the hearing.  First, the statute contemplates 
no discovery for arrested petitioners, thus evidence can be—and often is— 
withheld by the prosecution.  Second, nothing in the statute permits an 
arrested petitioner to file the complaint anonymously—and filing under 
the arrestee’s name makes the previously nonpublic record of arrest accessible 
to the multiple background search companies. Finally, the statute contains 
an irreconcilable statute of limitations conflict—likely a legislative oversight.
Amending the statute to fix these three issues would further facilitate the 
ability of the innocent to get a clean slate. 




Under section 851.8, the court may adjudicate factual innocence based
on “declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any other evidence submitted 
by the parties which is material, relevant, and reliable.”330  The statute’s
significant omission is a failure to authorize discovery for the benefit of 
arrested petitioners.  Though courts have taken a broad approach to the 
326. Id. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. at 398. 
329. Id. at 399. 
330. CAL.PENAL CODE § 851.8 (West 2011).  See supra Section II.E, discussing evidence
admissible at the hearing.
414
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evidence admissible at a factual innocence hearing, without any statutory 
or formal discovery tools, petitioners often have no access to even the most
basic evidence. Lack of access to discovery most affects those petitioners
seeking a factual innocence determination who have not been charged 
with the crime or against whom charges have been dismissed.331  An arrested
individual has limited resources, and those resources do not include any
crucial exculpatory evidence.332  Under California law, an individual may 
request his or her “rap sheet” from the Department of Justice.333  However, 
this record is of limited use, as it merely lists arrests and convictions and
a brief statement of their disposition.  Requesting a copy of the arrest report 
from the police department is equally unhelpful.334  Prior to releasing the
report, law enforcement authorities will ordinarily heavily edit most of the 
facts that they deem not pertinent to the petitioner.335  Some of the edited 
information may implicate other arrestees and thus be exculpatory to the 
petitioner. 
Without a statutory mandate in section 851.8, the prosecutors in most
cases will not produce evidence to a person who is not a criminal defendant. 
331. The third group of section 851.8 petitioners—those charged yet acquitted of all 
charges—will presumably have had access to prosecution’s evidence under the U.S. and
California Constitutions, as well as California’s statutory civil discovery scheme. 
332. Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in 
Criminal Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L.
REV. 465, 475 n.36 (1998) (“Discovery obligations attach only after a criminal case is filed 
in court.  Prior to filing the criminal charge, the prosecution has access to information not
available to the defense, especially if the defendant is indigent.  This information includes
police reports (or at least verbal information from the law enforcement agency investigating the
incident or affecting an arrest), lab reports, mental state assessments, medical reports, and
information from law enforcement sources from other jurisdictions.”). 
333. See Online Request Form, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF CAL.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://oag.ca.gov/contact/publicrecords_form [https://perma.cc/PA4S-
SNEQ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
334. Under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250–
6270, an individual may request as a public record a “report of crimes and incidents written
in the course of business of law enforcement agency.” See California Public Records Act, 
L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/i_want_to_know/content_basic_view/36329 
[https://perma.cc/987X-W4EA] (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). However, “[c]ertain records 
or portions of records are subject to privacy laws and/or other exemptions and are rarely
ever available for viewing.” Id.
 335. See, e.g., id. (identifying several items as most likely to be redacted from public 
records, such as, identifying juvenile, certain victim, or confidential informant information;
criminal offender record information; information that may endanger safety or jeopardize
an investigation, anything reflecting “analysis, recommendation or conclusion of the 
investigating officer,” etc.).
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The prosecution has a legitimate reason not to voluntarily disclose or
produce any evidence: this evidence could still be relevant or even crucial
in an active case. Petitioners have filed motions to compel production, 
but courts are hesitant to force the prosecutor to produce any evidence 
when there is no express authorization in the statute.  All criminal discovery 
is “governed exclusively by—and barred except as provided by” criminal 
discovery statute.336 
Factual innocence petitioners who were arrested but never charged are 
unique in their status of having no access to discovery. In California, 
parties to both civil and criminal cases are afforded broad discovery rights.
Section 851.8 is a part of California’s Penal Code, so most petitioners 
seeking to prove their factual innocence should at a minimum be able to 
avail themselves of California’s Penal Code discovery protections.  In a
criminal case, each side is subject to mandatory disclosure provisions of 
Penal Code sections 1054 to 1054.7.337  Penal Code section 1054.1 requires
the prosecuting attorney to disclose to the defendant the following categories
of information in possession of the prosecuting attorney:338 names and 
336. Hines v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712, 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
337. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (“The prosecution 
must also reveal the contents of plea agreements with key government witnesses, and under
some circumstances may be required to disclose the identity of undercover informants who 
possess evidence critical to the defense.” (first citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 150 (1972); and then citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 55 (1957))); People 
v. Ruthford, 534 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Cal. 1975) (recognizing “a duty on the part of the 
prosecution, even in the absence of a request therefor, to disclose all substantial material 
evidence favorable to an accused, whether such evidence relates directly to the question
of guilt, to matters relevant to punishment, or to the credibility of a material witness”).
Criminal discovery is governed by Criminal California Penal Code, Part 2 “Of Criminal 
Procedure,” Title 6 “Pleadings and Proceedings Before Trial,” Chapter 10 “Discovery,” 
Sections 1054–1054.10.  Constitutional discovery protections are even broader than
California’s statutory rights. See generally LEVENSON, supra note 142, § 16:6 (“The due
process clause of the United States Constitution requires that the prosecutor disclose substantial 
material evidence favorable to the accused.  This type of constitutionally mandated disclosure
is known as Brady discovery, and it is broader than that required by Penal Code § 1054.1. 
Material evidence for these purposes is evidence that may make the difference between
conviction and acquittal.  It includes evidence that is exculpatory, mitigating, or would
reduce a penalty, as well as evidence that could be used to impeach a prosecution witness.
The cumulative effect of all withheld evidence that is favorable to the defendant is considered, 
rather than individually considering the effect of each item of evidence.  The prosecutor
must disclose all evidence that reasonably appears favorable to the defendant.”). 
338. California’s Constitution provides that “[i]n order to provide for fair and speedy
trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature 
or by the people through the initiative process.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30.  Reciprocity here 
implies that both prosecution and defense are bound by the same discovery duties.  Under
this constitutional provision mandating reciprocal discovery in criminal cases and
authorizing prosecutorial discovery, once defense discloses information to prosecution,
416
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addresses of prosecution witnesses, statements of all defendants, all evidence, 
including any exculpatory evidence, felony convictions of any witnesses,
and any written statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to 
call at the trial, including experts.339 
In a typical factual innocence scenario, a person who was arrested but 
never charged wishes to clean up his or her record. Investigators and the 
prosecutor will be reluctant to proffer discovery when the charges are 
dropped or never filed because the crime may still be actively investigated 
in relation to codefendants.  To protect its interest in not disclosing 
potentially crucial evidence, the prosecution may request an in camera
review of any potential discovery to be produced to an arrested individual 
and his or her counsel. Thus, the statute must be amended to provide 
discovery to factual innocence petitioners, subject to the court’s in-camera 
review of all relevant evidence including, but not limited to, the police 
report and any inculpating or exonerating evidence.340  In camera review
would allow the court to determine which evidence should be discoverable 
to petitioner, and which evidence and information should remain under 
seal to protect the interests of the prosecution.  This approach would balance
the government’s interest in investigating crimes against the petitioner’s 
desire to exonerate himself.341 
Allowing the court to review in camera all evidence pertinent to petitioner’s
arrest would not jeopardize any currently active case for the prosecution. 
Rather, it would permit the court to adequately consider all “material,
prosecution in turn is obligated under its continuing duty of disclosure to tell defense of
any witnesses it intends to call in rebuttal. See Hobbs v. Mun. Court, 284 Cal. Rptr. 655, 
657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), overruled by People v. Tillis, 956 P.2d 409 (1998) (disapproving 
Hobbs to the extent it concluded that “due process reciprocity requirements expand[ed] 
the scope of discovery beyond the provisions of section 1054.1 . . . .”). 
339. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2011)
340. Under reciprocal discovery provisions of Penal Code section 1054.7, trial court 
may, “in its discretion, order briefing and argument on a contested issue of privilege, and
conduct in camera hearing where necessary.”  Izazaga v. Super. Ct., 815 P.2d 304, 322 
(Cal. 1991). See generally 20A CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law: Pretrial Proceedings § 927
(2015) (“A verbatim record must be made of the in-camera proceeding.  If the court grants
relief, the entire record of the in-camera showing must be sealed and preserved in the
records of the court, and must be made available to an appellate court in the event of an
appeal or writ. In its discretion, the court may, after trial and conviction, unseal any
previously sealed matter.” (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West 2015))). 
341. Discovery produced to petitioner will likely turn on a reciprocal obligation to
produce evidence to the prosecution, as mandated by article I, section 30 of the California
Constitution, subject to the protections of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
PENAL § 851.8. 
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relevant, and reliable” evidence as is mandated by the statute.  This evidence 
would include the complete and un-redacted police report, which may 
inculpate other individuals, and would thus be material and relevant to
petitioner’s innocence. In addition to the information included in the
police report, law enforcement or the prosecuting attorney may also have
other real evidence in their possession, such as photographs of the alleged 
crime scene, any impounded contraband, fingerprints of petitioner, and 
other arrested individuals, and DNA samples.  In their investigation subsequent
to the arrest, law enforcement may also have come across other exculpatory 
evidence in conducting witness interviews or post-arrest crime scene 
analysis.  In other words, any exculpatory evidence available to the
prosecution should be accessible to factual innocence petitioners.  This 
approach would be in accord with California’s criminal discovery scheme.
However, in maintaining the balancing approach taken by California 
legislature, the prosecution should be permitted to request an initial in
camera review so as not to interfere with any active investigation or
prosecution. 
B. Need for Anonymity 
Factually innocent petitioners who have previously been charged will 
file their section 851.8 request as part of their original criminal case under
its original captions—for example, People v. Smith. The goal in those 
cases will be to temporarily seal and eventually destroy the entire record, 
including the factual innocence petition itself.  As contemplated by the 
statute, relief under this section permanently removes any record of this
offense from the defendant’s rap sheet. 
The situation is much more complicated for those individuals who were 
arrested but never charged—their arrest records, although public, are not 
generally accessible, except in limited circumstances.342  Filing a section 
851.8 factual innocence petition under the arrestee’s name would immediately
publicize the fact and the details of the arrest. In the initial petition, an
individual will have to disclose all information on the form supplied by 
the Department of Justice—the form that will be attached to the court
filing.343  A court filing becomes public and is thus accessible to various
private background check companies, who send daily runners to California 
courthouses for record updates.344  Creating a public record of what the
State of California has previously decided is nonsensical and goes against 
342. See supra notes 331–32. 
343. See supra note 122. 
344. See supra Section I.C.
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the statute’s ultimate goal—the destruction of the record in appropriate 
circumstances. 
Neither section 851.8 nor any other California statute currently provides 
any anonymity protections for the arrestees attempting to clear their
records.345  Some practitioners have ingenuously been filing these petitions 
under the individual’s initials in the caption, continuing to refer to the 
petitioner anonymously throughout the petition. Even though some courts 
have accepted such petitions—others have rejected them as without any 
authority—other significant problems remain unaddressed by this approach.  
The petition itself must disclose specific facts about the arrest—and frequently
a petitioner’s name may be ascertained from these facts.  For instance, a 
petitioner will need to attach as an exhibit their previously filed police
petition form to demonstrate that they have met the condition precedent of a
previous filing with law enforcement.  That form, as mentioned supra,346 
requests very detailed information from petitioner, such as name, date of 
birth, driver’s license number, address and even social security number,
optionally.
To redact any information from the filing, a petitioner must have first
moved the court for permission to seal, requesting redaction as well as
that the filing be permitted under petitioner’s initials. Some clerks of court 
have refused to accept petitions with contemporaneous motions to seal,
demanding that the case caption contain petitioner’s full name until the 
motion is granted—a circular issue with no resolution. 
The appropriate amendment here would be simple, noncontroversial, 
and within the spirit of the statute. The California legislature should
amend the procedural portion of the statute to permit the initial filing 
under seal with the arrestee’s initials in the caption, so long as petitioner
 345. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 1955) allows plaintiffs to designate unknown
defendants by a fictitious name (Jane or John Doe).  However, this section “requires that 
the plaintiff be truly ignorant of the name of the Doe defendant when the complaint was 
filed, and dictates that the amendment be filed as soon as the name of a Doe is learned.” 
ERIC E. YOUNGER & DONALD E. BRADLEY, CALIFORNIA MOTIONS § 15:20 (2d ed. 2005). 
Under Section 827 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which provides for confidentiality
of records in the juvenile court, courts have allowed use of initials or a first name and first 
initial of the last name for minors.  See T.N.G. v. Super. Ct., 484 P.2d 981, 981 n.1 (Cal. 
1971); 9 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 799 (5th ed. 2008).  Factual innocence
petitioners are not covered by either statute. 
346. See supra Section II.A. 
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submits a contemporaneous motion to seal.347  This motion to seal is required
because without the court’s specific finding that petitioner’s privacy 
interest outweighs the interest of the public in accessing public records, 
such sealing and redaction would likely violate both the California and
U.S. Constitutions.348 
In this initial motion to seal, petitioners should advocate that their
privacy is the “overriding interest supporting closure” and that it outweighs 
the interests of the public access to court records.349  First, under California
law, arrest records are not generally accessible to the public.350  Second, 
courts have previously recognized that petitioners may have a privacy interest 
in their arrest records.351  There is a “substantial probability” that revealing 
arrest-specific information would cause prejudice to petitioners in the 
absence of the sealing: indeed, it would defeat the purpose of the statute
and is thus against the intent of the legislature. Petitioners should “narrowly
tailor” their request to seal by redacting only the information that could 
lead to the identification of the individual, such as name, date of birth, 
driver’s license number, and other personal information. The motion should
be supplied with any other facts specific to each petitioner. 
347. Under California Rules of Court, Rule 2.551, a court order is required to file 
any record under seal—the parties cannot stipulate to a filing under seal.  A motion to seal 
must “be accompanied by a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to 
justify the sealing.”  CAL. R. CT. 2.551(b)(1).  While the motion is pending, the movant 
will file one public, redacted version of the 851.8 petition and lodge with the court the 
complete version “conditionally under seal.” R. 2.551(b)(4)–(5). 
348. The public has a First Amendment right of access to civil litigation documents
filed in court and used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication.  NBC Subsidiary
(KNBC–TV), Inc. v. Super. Ct., 980 P.2d 337, 358 (Cal. 1999). 
[T]he United States Supreme Court and numerous unanimous lower courts have 
held that the First Amendment of the federal Constitution generally precludes 
closure of substantive courtroom proceedings in criminal cases unless a trial 
court provides notice to the public on the question of closure and after a hearing 
finds that (i) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure; (ii) there is a 
substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure; (iii) the
proposed closure is narrowly tailored to serve that overriding interest; and (iv)
there is no less restrictive means of achieving that overriding interest.
Id. at 340. 
349. Id.
 350. See WITKIN, supra note 29, at 972. 
351. Hous. Auth. v. Van de Kamp, 272 Cal. Rptr. 584, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(“[W]e are mindful that under the statutory scheme set forth by the Legislature, nondisclosure
of criminal records is the general rule. While the Legislature has set forth the exceptions 
to the general rule in section 11105, subdivisions (b) and (c), those exceptions are to be
narrowly construed.  Because these records contain extremely sensitive and private
information, all doubts are resolved against disclosure.” (first citing Younger v. Berkeley
City Council, 119 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); and then citing Opinion No. 59-
300, 36 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 1 (Cal. Attorney Gen. July 1, 1960))). 
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Thus, the procedural portion of the statute should be amended to allow 
petitioners to file under their initials only, while simultaneously submitting a
motion to seal with the court.  Thus, the entire filing, including the petition, 
declaration, memorandum of points and authorities, and any attachments, 
would be either redacted or completely under seal until the court rules on 
the motion to seal.352 
C. Time Restrictions 
There is an irreconcilable conflict between the time restriction for filing 
factual innocence petitions and the statute of limitations for the underlying 
crimes.  The current version of subsection (l) of the statute imposes a two-
year time limit for filing the petition “from the date of the arrest or filing 
of the accusatory pleading, whichever is later.”353  This time restriction 
may be waived if the petitioner can show “good cause” and “absence of 
prejudice.”354 On the other hand, part (b) of the statute contemplates that
factual innocence petitions will be filed “after the running of the relevant 
statute of limitations.”355 
The time restriction does not present any issues for misdemeanor
crimes, but it is problematic in its application to felony arrests. If a
petitioner is arrested on suspicion of a misdemeanor, the district attorney
has one year to bring charges.  After the expiration of the one-year time 
period, the arrestee can file for exoneration in compliance with the two-
year time restriction in section 851.8(l). However, if the underlying crime 
was a felony, the government has three years from the time of the arrest
to charge the arrestee with the felony.356  Filing a factual innocence
352. If the court denies the motion to seal, finding that petitioner’s privacy interests
are outweighed by the interest of public access to information, petitioner’s information
will be temporarily accessible.  If the 851.8 petition to seal and destroy is ultimately
granted, petitioner or his or her counsel will need to be extra diligent to ensure the record 
of the proceeding has not been disseminated. Section 851.8’s remedy extends to the
sealing and destruction of the entire record of the factual innocence petition if the petitioner 
is successful.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (West 2015).  It will be important to verify that 
both government and private entities comply with the court’s order.
353. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(l) (West 2011).  There is a special exception for
filings that were made prior to January 1, 1983 that is of no import to this discussion. 
354. Id.
 355. Id. § 851.8(b). 
356. CAL. PENAL CODE § 801 (West 2011) (“Except as provided in Sections 799 and 
800, prosecution for an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or pursuant 
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petition in compliance with the two-year time limit in 851.8(l) would be 
premature, as the relevant statute of limitations for the felony will not yet 
have run. On the other hand, waiting until the lapse of the felony statute 
of limitations would bar the filing of a factual innocence petition as untimely. 
Petitioner’s only option at that time would be to qualify for a waiver through
showing of “good cause” and “absence of prejudice.” 
This irresoluble conflict appears to be the result of a legislative oversight. 
The current version of the statute is inadequate in its case-by-case approach 
to waiver of time restrictions. The legislature likely contemplated the need
for a waiver only in exceptional cases. Under the current irreconcilable
time limitations, petitioners must try to qualify for a waiver in each case 
for which they await the expiration of the underlying statute of limitations. 
For instance, a person arrested on charges of possession of controlled
substances would likely be informed by the police department that the 
prosecution has three years to bring charges.357  Waiting for the expiration 
of the statute of limitation will cause the arrestee to violate the two-year 
time restriction in 851.8(l).  Before briefing the merits of his or her factual 
innocence, this petitioner will need to meet the stringent requirements of 
showing “good cause” and “absence of prejudice.” 
Another approach currently used by a few petitioners is to move for a 
determination of timeliness within the two-year time restriction under 
851.8(l).  Petitioners have asked the court to rule that the subsequent petition
to be filed upon the expiration of the three-year felony statute of limitations
would be timely.  This latter approach is meant to obviate the need to show 
“good cause” and “absence of prejudice.” Neither of these measures should 
be necessary.
Subsection (l) should be amended to clarify that the two-year restriction
starts running from the expiration of the longest statute of limitations for 
charging the underlying crimes.  So for the arrests on suspicion of both 
misdemeanor and felony violations, the longer felony statute of limitations
should serve as the trigger for the 851.8(l) clock.  In other words, in cases 
of felony arrests, an arrestee would have to file his or her factual innocence
petition within two years after the three-year statute has run. 
Allowing factual innocence petitions prior to the expiration of the statute
of limitations on the underlying crimes would impede the government’s
legitimate interest in prosecution of offenses.  The government should not
have to defend against a factual innocence petition prior to the expiration 
of the statute of limitations. In fact, the prosecution could well be preparing 
to file charges against the arrestee and other suspects.  Having to face the
to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 shall be commenced within three years after commission of
the offense.”).
357. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350 (West 2015). 
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petitioner in court with introduction of the evidence may hamper the 
government’s case not only against the petitioner but against any potential
co-defendants. 
The following proposed amendment would eliminate the need to qualify
for a waiver in each case for which a petitioner waits until the lapse of the 
underlying statute of limitations; yet it would preserve the interests of the
government to effectively investigate and prosecute crimes.  It would also 
promote more efficient administration of justice, obviating the court’s 
need to rule either on a motion for determination of timeliness or on the 
fact-intensive issues of waiver. This amendment also preserves the good 
cause waiver in exceptional cases when a petitioner could not timely file 
within the two-year time limit. 
D. Proposed Amendments to California Penal Code Section 851.8 
The statute should thus be amended to fix the flaws discussed in Parts 
A through C: 
(b) . . . In any case where the petition of an arrestee to the law enforcement
agency to have an arrest record destroyed is denied, petition may be made to the
superior court that would have had territorial jurisdiction over the matter.  Petition
may initially be filed under the arrestee’s initials in the case caption with all 
personal identifying information conditionally under seal, if the arrestee simultaneously
with the petition files a motion to seal pursuant to Rules of Court, Rules 2.550 to
2.551.  A copy of the petition shall be served on the law enforcement agency and
the prosecuting attorney of the county or city having jurisdiction over the offense 
at least 10 days prior to the hearing thereon.  The prosecuting attorney and the 
law enforcement agency through the district attorney may present evidence to the 
court at the hearing. Petitioner shall be granted discovery rights pursuant to Penal 
Code §§ 1054 to 1054.7, subject to the prosecuting attorney’s right to request a 
preliminary in camera review of any evidence. Notwithstanding Section 1538.5
or 1539, any judicial determination of factual innocence made pursuant to this
section may be heard and determined upon declarations, affidavits, police reports, 
or any other evidence submitted by the parties which is material, relevant, and
reliable . . . . 
(l) For arrests occurring on or after January 1, 1981, and for accusatory pleadings
filed on or after January 1, 1981, petitions for relief under this section may be
filed up to two years from the date of the expiration of the statute of limitations 
for underlying crimes or from the date of filing of the accusatory pleading,
whichever is later.  Any time restrictions on filing for relief under this section
may be waived upon a showing of good cause by the petitioner and in the absence 
of prejudice. 
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E. Alternative Approaches 
The statute generally achieves a fair balance between the interests of the
government and private entities in accurate record keeping and retention and
the desire of those factually innocent to clear their record.  Commentators 
have suggested, however, that section 851.8 places an insurmountable 
onus on innocent petitioners, thus violating procedural due process of the 
California Constitution.358  One alternate approach proposes an “inversion 
of the section 851.8 standard and procedure.”359  Under this approach, in
the absence of a criminal charge or when the arrested person has been
acquitted, there should be a presumptive right to seal the record.360  This
inversion proposal would place the burden on the prosecution to rebut this 
“presumptive right through evidence tending to show that the State’s
interest in retaining the record overrides the arrested person’s interest in
sealing it.”361 The main problem with this approach is that it places an
undue burden on the state in scenarios when arrestees have “no presumptive
entitlements” and are seeking a statutory remedy.362  The statutory scheme
does not deprive factually innocent petitioners of any right—to the contrary, 
it provides a sweeping remedy of sealing and destroying the records and 
a viable mechanism to achieve that remedy.  The presumptive sealing of 
the record also ignores the government’s and the public First Amendment 
interest in access to all criminal records.  As to the triggers for the presumptive
sealing, this approach ignores that there may be many reasons other than
innocence for a prosecutor to decide not to bring charges associated with
a particular arrest. For instance, a much larger case could be under investigation
at the time against the same petitioner.  Acquittals are also an inadequate 
trigger for the presumptive sealing of the records: as discussed above, 
acquittals very often do not speak to a petitioner’s innocence but may be 
based on a variety of technical grounds.  Finally, law enforcement and 
district attorneys simply do not have the resources to put on a full evidentiary 
defense of their position in each case they choose not to concur with
presumptive sealing.  A factual innocence determination is a statutory
remedy—and not a criminal proceeding—so the statute rightly places the 
burden on the petitioner. 
358. Lyons, supra note 56, at 509–10, 519 (first citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a); and
then citing People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 624 (Cal. 1979)). 
359. Id. at 521. 
360. Id.
 361. Id.
 362. Id. at 512–13, 522. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the current flaws in the statute, section 851.8 mostly reaches the
social goals of expungement by removing onerous collateral consequences
of criminal records.  The statute, for the most part, strikes the right balance
between the interest of the government and society in keeping accurate
records and the interests of individuals. The statutory flaws are not 
irreparable; the proposed changes would mitigate petitioner’s burden by
providing access to discovery, securing privacy through anonymity protections,
and clarifying the timing conflicts in the statute. 
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